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I.

INTODUCTION

A. From NEPA to CEQA Through AB 1301 and
Proposition20 to Just
The widespread and growing concern about protecting the natural environment from unnecessary and unreasonable land use is
demonstrated by the frequent local and national communications
of the news media, the cases discussed in this article, and the
four legislative acts upon which this article is based.
At the national level, Congress manifested its environmental
concern by passing the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter, NEPA).1 This law requires that all federal agencies use
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certain procedures, including an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), to assure full consideration of environmental factors

for all major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. 2

In California, the Legislature passed the California Environmental Quality Act (hereinafter, CEQA).S This act makes an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) necessary whenever the State or
a local government is involved in carrying out or approving proj4
ects which may have a significant effect on the environment.
NEPA, and to a lesser extent CEQA, have had a great impact
on governmental decision making. When various environmental
groups realized that the federal agencies were not complying fully
with the mandates of NEPA, they successfully sued to enjoin
projects until NEPA's requirements were met. Initial cases
brought under CEQA, and the California courts' recognition of the
similarities between NEPA and CEQA, are strong evidence that
California courts will decide that CEQA should have as large an
impact on decision making at the state and local levels as NEPA
has had on federal decision making 5 and as much effect in regulating private land use as NEPA has had in regulating government actions.
In 1972, the voters of California passed the Coastal Zone Initiative, popularly known as Proposition 20,6 or the Coastal Zone
Initiative, in an attempt to preserve and restore the coastline's
natural resources. Created by the initiative were new agencies
which were given the power to issue permits as well as the obligation to submit to the legislature long term plans for coastline
development.7 Additionally, the legislature passed new laws popularly known as A.B. 1301,8 further regulating the development of
new subdivisions. Both the initiative and A.B. 1301 include provisions for finding facts about the environment and both provide
for denial of permits if certain findings are made.
2. Discussed infra, Sec. II.
3. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-.21174 (West Supp. 1973).
4. Discussed infra, Sec. II
5. Some of these NEPA cases are considered infra, See. II, as a basis
for predicting how California courts will handle similar situations.
6. Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. Pus. REs. CODE §§ 2700027650 (West Supp. 1973).
7. Discussed infra, Sec. IV.
8. A.B. 1301, Stats. 1971, ch. 1446 amends §§ 11510, 11511, 11526, 11535
and 11540.1 of, and adds §§ 11526.1, 11549.5, and 11549.6 to, the CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE (West Supp. 1973) and amends § 65850 of, adds §§ 65450.1,
65451 and 65452 to and repeals § 65461 of the CAL. Gov. CODE (West Supp.
1973).
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The thesis of this article is that by arguing analogously from
NEPA to CEQA to obtain adequate disclosure of adverse environmental effects from proposed land uses and by using the facts thus
disclosed in making the requisite findings for Proposition 20 and
A.B. 1301, decision makers may be required to deny permits in
certain environmentally sensitive areas that are currently under
great development pressures.
However, the statutory analysis does not complete this environmentally sensitive land use regulation package. Denial of permits that severely limit or even completely eliminate any economic
use of one's property raise the issue of whether the regulation is
an unconstitutional use of the police power. The thesis of this article is completed by analysis of several California and non-California cases that arguably make such environmentally sensitive
denials of permits constitutionally justified. In particular, a recent case from Wisconsin, Just v. Marinette County,9 reflects increasing judicial willingness to uphold regulations that deprive an
owner of almost all economic return from his property where
ecological concerns suggest the need for leaving the land in its
natural state. While several California cases, when combined, rep-

resent almost as strong a position as Just, this Wisconsin case completes the environmentally sensitive land use regulation pack0
age.1
To fully comprehend the possible far-reaching effects of these
statutes and cases such as Just, an understanding of environmentally sensitive zoning, the participants in the system, and the role
of courts in the local decision making process is essential.
B.

Environmentally Sensitive Zoning

Traditional or Euclidian zoning, as sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company,"1 is a system of land use regulation that identifies a
limited number of land use categories and spreads them "rationally" over a grid system. The assumption is that residential areas
9. 56 Wis. 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
10. Just as well as several other inverse condemnation cases are discussed infra, Sec. V.
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

should be separated from commercial sections, both should be separated from industrial areas and so on. Within each of these
broad land use categories there may be further refinements by
density or other criteria. Moreover, the boundary lines between
uses are often planned as buffer zones so that, for example, high
density rather than low density residential areas are adjacent to
commercial and industrial areas. Specialized uses, such as churches,
schools, graveyards and amusement parks, do not fall within the
broad categories and are treated individually outside of the grid
plan by special use permits. To be deemed valid, the zoning plan
must be "comprehensive" and must reflect the theoretically best
set of land use interrelationships.' 2 This type of zoning is environmentally insensitive since it is designed for a flat plane and
does not necessarily consider topography or other physical characteristics.
This article is concerned with modifications to this comprehensive Euclidian zoning by what is termed "environmentally sensitive zoning." This means that, when physical characteristics are
present which make the land unusually sensitive from an ecological or environmental point of view, the environmental impact
should be considered in the decision on how and even whether the
land is to be developed. Examples of environmentally sensitive
lands include: flood plains, lagoons, swamps, marsh lands, rocky
and sandy beaches, faults with earthquake potential, canyons,

mountains, steep slopes, cliffs, vistas, unique flora and fauna as
well as wildlife habitats (especially for vanishing species or significant links in the ecocycle) and mineral deposits. In addition,
although not strictly environmental, consideration would be given
to the preservation of anthropological, historical, or cultural sites
which by their very nature are unique. Specifically, the land
involved is presently undeveloped or underdeveloped and has
peculiar characteristics such that the types of development typically allowed in the past arguably should be precluded in view of
the growing understanding of ecological interrelationships.
C. The Participants in the Local Decision Making Process
Concern over the legislation discussed in this article is widespread. Initially the development of procedures caused delays in
12. Of course, through planned unit developments, floating zones, downzoning until development takes place, increased use of special use permits,
etc., zoning has become much more ad hoc than this analysis suggests.
But these other techniques are not inherently environmentally sensitive
either.
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permit handling; currently the satisfaction of these procedural requirements, more than the actual making of environmentally
sensitive decisions, greatly extends the lead time of the applicant.

Landowners may find the market is less willing to buy because of
these added uncertainties, or prices may be depressed and only
those willing and able to take longer term risks can invest in land.
The landowner or developer is faced with holding costs, at a time
of higher property taxes, rising interest rates, and other rapidly
increasing costs. The financing institutions find that the delays
have undermined the expected cash flow for short term debts of
developers. The trade unions fear loss of employment from delay
or a possible permanent decrease in building. Various segments of
the population, including Chambers of Commerce, watch for signs
that the slowing or stopping of the building boom is affecting
other segments of the local economy.
A variety of citizens' groups are arguing for new restrictions
upon further development and, in some cases, for no growth at
all. These groups may be national or local, and may be experienced or naive in their understanding and ability to manipulate
the political and legal processes to their own goals. Some are
interested in one project, one area or one environmental "cause."
Others appear to have primary concerns that are not environmental in origin, although they advance environmental arguments.
The participants are varied-from the neighbor who feels threatened by a proposed development but doesn't know what to do, to
the university scientist whose concern arises from his professional
interest in his particular discipline.
Hearings on land use decisions have never been placid because
of the economic interests involved. Now, however, they are

marked by greater controversy and confusion as citizens appear in
vocal numbers to register protests and present petitions on environmental issues. Environmental arguments may be advanced
at times when the true motive is something else. But in many
instances, these persons believe that their arguments fall on deaf
ears. They argue that, notwithstanding the environmental protest,
the vast majority of projects are eventually undertaken or approved by the government.
One chief concern of those arguing strongly for environmental
protection is the belief that the control of private land use de-

velopment is the most important arena if the physical environment is to be maintained and improved. Steps are being taken at
the national level to control automobile and energy sources of
pollution. State and federal agencies can eventually be made environmentally aware by way of such legislation as NEPA and
CEQA. However, environmentalists are less sure of an increase
in environmental awareness among the literally hundreds of citties, counties and commissions within California which have the
ultimate authority over private land development. This concern
is that the thousands of individual decisions, which standing alone
are not necessarily significant, will gradually erode the remaining
particularly sensitive lands.
Elected officials, who are responsible for enforcing the new legislation, are deluged with new laws and guidelines, while their
staffs seek desperately to develop management tools which are responsive to the new rules. On the one hand, elected officials are
concerned with expanding the tax base and increasing their sphere
of influence; on the other hand, they are concerned with whether
adequate municipal services can be supplied.
Despite some interesting and worthwhile studies of how local
land use decisions are made, 13 it is difficult to describe definitively how land use/environmental decision makers at the local
level are, in fact, influenced by the various legal, political, social,
physical and economic arguments with which they are deluged.
As to the role of strictly legal arguments, the legislation and case
law which purports to govern their behavior is vague, difficult
for anyone to understand, and subject to continuing change. These
officials are normally not lawyers nor do they have any formal
training in the law which applies to their decision making. One

could speculate that much of their legal knowledge comes from
the unsystematic and segmented application of legal concepts
learned piecemeal from private and government attorneys, as well
as non-legally trained planning staffs, developers, landowners and
citizens groups. This makes it extremely difficult for the decision
maker to evaluate the information received, especially in view of
the inherent uncertainty about the extent of his legal responsibility.
At the other extreme, one cannot assume that there is any substantial conflict of interest particularly at the overt bribery level.
The apparent conflicts reflect the decision maker's cultural, so13. E.g., see
ZONING GAME

MANDELKER,

(1969).

THE ZONING DILEMMA

(1971); BABCOCK, TiIE
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cial and economic biases which usually identify him with a particular point of view or with those who advocate a particular
cause. 14 Even local office seekers must, in many instances, have
reached some level of personal wealth to run for office. If this
wealth has not come through development-related endeavours, the
values held by such persons are likely to favor the highest economic use rather than the highest environmental use. Planning
Commissioners are frequently selected because of their prior expertise in land use development areas and, thus, it is not uncommon to find bankers, architects, engineers, attorneys who represent private landowners, and other persons who tend to identify
with landowners and land developers in these positions. This is
not to suggest dishonesty in elected officials. Rather, it is to
point out that in the absence of any well defined limits on discretionary power, it is not surprising that decisions in some cases
are a response to political pressures from developers who themselves, often reflect the identical biases of the decision makers.
Unless he is threatened by voter retaliation at the polls, it is only
natural for an elected decision maker to follow his own value
system in making decisions. A legislative policy to the contrary
would not suddenly change this, particularly since there is no
formal educational process whereby such a change, its philosophy
and implications can be transmitted to those in office. Thus,
there is probably a tendency to respond slowly to the new or at
least renewed interest in the environment.
This assumes that the various attempts to develop systems or
management approaches to solving land use problems have not
matured to the point where such approaches could be used even if
the decision makers were willing. The complicated process of
developing models whereby computers with adequate data and
some type of quantification or ranking of the goals and values of
the decision makers, may eventually supply a workable system of
solving short and long-term land use problems. However, without
a realistic method to evaluate long term trade-offs it is questionable whether the legislature and the courts will condone over a
long period of time a single purpose goal such as the absolute pro14. In addition, there is the problem of financing political campaigns.
Land owners and land developers commonly contribute heavily to local
political candidates.

tection of the environment which this article suggests is mandated
by present law.
In the absence of a systems management approach or a satisfactory economic analysis, a short term legislative decision that is
relatively absolute in requiring preservation of the present natural environment would seem to be the only approach to avoid irretrievable and irreversible losses. The article points out legislation which on its face requires this.
D. The Scope of JudicialReview
Throughout this article there is a twofold approach to the effect
to be given to the mandates under the Coastal Zone Initiative' 5
'and A.B. 1301.16 It is assumed that those local decision makers who
are made aware of these laws and the cases interpreting them, will
follow their legal responsibility as office holders in making land
use decisions. At the same time, there is a countervailing thrust
that, if decision makers do not fulfill this responsibility, a viable
potential exists for lawsuits to force them to do so. Whether the
theoretical possibility of judicial control will become a practical
reality can only be determined by a test case or cases concerned
with whether or not the decision makers involved are, in fact, subject to this type of judicial review. The traditional rule, of course,
is that the courts will not interfere with these decisions unless
there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 17 In other
words, the courts will not reverse unless there is no evidence to
support the particular decision in question.
The scope of judicial review of discretionary decision making by
local governmental entities is an area of great legal uncertainty
concerning both the legal rules setting the limits on the extent of
review and the decision making behaviour which is being evaluated. In his recent book, Discretionary Justice, Kenneth Culp
Davis, a leading writer on administrative law,' 8 points out that
there is no systematic scholarly effort to evaluate qualitatively and
quantitatively the extent to which discretionary acts conform to
the letter and spirit of the legislative mandate. 19 While he is
writing primarily of state and federal agencies other than those
involved in land use administration, his observations throughout
15. Infra, Sec. IV.
16. Infra, Sec. II.

17. See text accompanying notes 85-101, infra.

18. See DAvis, ADm isTnArvE LAw TRE1TsE (1958).
19. DAvis, DiSCRmoNARY JusTicE, at v-vi (1969).
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are in many instances relevant to the land use decision making
process.
Similarly, the process of local land use decision making has not
been empirically studied so that it can be precisely described. The
emphasis in legal and social research has concentrated on other
legal institutions. Thus, the statements in the article about the
characteristics of local decision making are not based upon precise empirical
20
accurate.

data, although the general picture is undoubtedly

The question asked by the environmentalist is whether or not
it is possible to bring a lawsuit or a series of lawsuits to cause a
governmental decision maker to deny totally or modify substantially the proposed development because environmentally sensitive characteristics are being adversely affected or destroyed.
This last statement, of course, suggests that the decision maker
may not be giving adequate consideration to environmental issues or may be making poor or even illegal decisions. However,
as pointed out above, persons in elected or appointed positions
may have a tendency to lean toward the short term economically
favorable plan or may be unaware of the implications of the present law. No matter what the reason for the decision, the intent
here is not to raise the spector of prolonged and often unnecessary
delays as various bodies appeal to the courts. Rather, it is to
21
point out that the law does authorize such environmental suits.

Government decision makers obviously have a legal responsibility
to conform to the law. Presumably, they do not want to reach
decisions which later prove inconsistent with developing case law,
so they require assurances that their environmentally sensitive
decisions will stand up in court. One suspects, however, that
there may be some tendency on the part of government, particularly at the local level, to allow private property owners to use
their lands as they wish because of political damage which may
result from a lawsuit. If the landowner is successful, he may try
20. The author has to rely on various isolated contacts throughout the
state as well as more substantial observations in the San Diego region.
The reader is cautioned, however, that no particular government is being
described herein.
21. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 27424-27426 (West Supp. 1973); CEQA, CAL.
Pus. REs. CODE § 21168 (West Supp. 1973).

to recover substantial sums by way of inverse condemnation 22 or
have his permit denial reversed resulting in a substantial delay
23
for both sides.
More specific analysis of the scope of judicial review is developed within.24 Throughout that discussion, generalizations
about vital legal distinctions which could make a difference in specific applications of the theories postulated are necessary. The
process being reviewed may technically be a legislative one, as for
example when the City Council or Board of Supervisors adopts
ordinances setting general zoning policy, in which case local government law governs the standard of review. 25 Or, the decision
may be made by individual administrators, boards or commissions
who come under the aegis of administrative law because they are
clearly performing a ministerial task. 26 It is impossible to set
out in detail in an article of this length, the narrow and technical
differences that may arise because of these variations. One testing
the basic theories will have to examine this question further in
the particular setting in which the questions arise.
The four enactments being considered all express a firm and
clear commitment to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. Each contains language which exactly parallels or is
similar in meaning to the wording in the others. This article explores the interrelationships among the four and suggests possible

cross-overs among them which would enable courts in certain instances to review not only the procedure used in the decision making process but also to some extent the substantive decision itself.
The first problem is to determine whether the land to be developed is, in fact, environmentally sensitive and to provide a
method of providing that information to the decision maker. In
California this information is developed for federal projects under NEPA and for local proposals under CEQA.
II.

CEQA AN NEPA

A. The Policy Behind the Acts
The California Environmental Quality Act 27 enunciates a clear
22. See Sec. V, infra, where it is argued that no inverse condemnation
should arise when the police power is unconstitutionally used to regulate
land use, although the regulation should then be voided.
23. It is perhaps unfair to allude to "sides" in environmental issues.
Developers can be environmentally sensitive, but rightly deplore wasted
time in administrative delays.
24. See text accompanying notes 121-126, infra.
25. See generally, MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL COIRORATIONS § 10.37 (1949),
26. See DAvis, ADMnsTRATI
LAW TREATISE, Chs. 29 & 30 (1958).
27. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21174 (West Supp. 1973).
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legislative policy that state and local governments must adopt a
broad commitment to protecting the environment for both present
and future generations in making land use decisions. The objectives are to attain a rational balance between man and his environment, between the use and the preservation of that environment, and between health, safety and beauty on the one hand and
28
productivity on the other.

28. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West Supp. 1973). The Legislature finds
and declares as follows:
(a) The maintenance of a quality environment for the people
of this state now and in the future is a matter of statewide concern.

(b) It is necessary to provide a high-quality environment that

at all times is healthful and pleasing to the senses and intellect

of man.

(c) There is a need to understand the relationship between the
maintenance of high-quality ecological systems and the general
welfare of the people of the state, including their enjoyment of
the natural resources of the state.
(d) The capacity of the environment is limited, and it is the
intent of the Legislature that the government of the state take
immediate steps to identify any critical thresholds for the health
and safety of the people of the state and take all coordinated actions necessary to prevent such thresholds being reached.
(e) Every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.
(f) The interrelationship of policies and practices in the management of natural resources and waste disposal requires systematic and concerted efforts by public and private interests to
enhance environmental quality and to control environmental pollution.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the
state government which regulate activities of private individuals,
corporations and public agencies which are found to affect the
quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that
major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage.
(Added by Stats. 1970, Ch. 1433.)
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001 (West Supp. 1973).
The Legislature further
finds and declares that it is the policy of the state to:
(a) Develop and maintain a high-quality environment now and
in the future, and take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate,
and enhance the environmental quality of the state.
(b) Take all action necessary to provide the people of this state
with clean air and water, enjoyment of aesthetic, natural, scenic,
and historic environmental qualities, and freedom from excessive
noise.
(c) Prevent the elimination of fish or wildlife species due to
man's activities, insure that fish and wildlife populations do not
drop below self-perpetuating levels, and preserve for future generations representations of all plant and animal communities and
examples of the major periods of California history.
(d) Ensure that the long-term protection of the environment
shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions.
(e) Create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony to fulfill the social and eco-

'703

However, the courts in California have not yet had the opportunity to express fully their views as to precisely what this California policy under CEQA means nor what the role of the courts
will be in relating the policies to specific decisions. 29 To date
there have been only five California appellate court opinions under CEQA, and two were decided prior to substantial amendments to the Act. 0
The California courts have, however, recognized the parallelism
between CEQA 31 and the National Environmental Policy Act of
196932 in the famous Friends of Mammoth case.88 This parallelism
arises in part because the former was obviously modeled after the
latter.8 4 Thus, it is appropriate to use federal court decisions under NEPA in "speculating" and even "predicting" what the state
courts will do under CEQA.8 5
nomic requirements of present and future generations.
(f) Require governmental agencies at all levels to develop
standards and procedures necessary to protect environmental quality.

(g) Require governmental agencies at all levels to consider
qualitative factors as well as economic and technical factors and
long-term benefits and costs, in addition to short-term benefits
and costs and to consider alternatives to proposed actions affecting
the environment.
29. An analysis of the history of the first case, and the amendments
that it encouraged, as well as an analysis of the many unresolved problems is provided in Senecker, The Legislative Response to Friends of
Mammoth-DeveZopers Chase the Will-o'-The-Wisp, 48 CAL. STATE BAIl
J.126 (1973).

30. The cases decided before the amendments accomplished by A.B.

889, Act of Dec. 5, 1972, ch. 1154 [19721 Cal. Laws (Deering's), are Friends

of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 1 as modified
at 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972), 4 ERC 1593 as
modified at 4 ERC 1705 and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside
County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972), 4 ERC
1573. Post A.B. 889 decisions are: Desert Environment Conservation Ass'n.
v. Pub. Util. Comm., -

Cal. App. 3d -,

106 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1973); San Fran-

cisco Planning and Urban Renewal Ass'n. v. Cent. Permit Bureau, - Cal.
App. 3d -, 106 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1973); County of Inyo v. Yorty, - Cal. App.
3d -, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
31. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21174 (West Supp. 1973).

32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
33. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.
3d 1, as modified at 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972)
4 ERC 1593 as modified at 4 ERC 1705; to the same effect, see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water District, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972), 4 ERC 1573; County of Inyo v.
Yorty, - Cal. App. 3d -, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
34. See especially, text accompanying note 64, infra, for the parallelism.
35. For precise questions relating to NEPA's affect on the interpretation of CEQA, one should examine the interim federal guidelines as they
existed at the time CEQA was adopted. See, 35 Fo. REG. 7390, (1970).
For NEPA the current final regulations apply. See, 36 FED. REG, 7724

(1972).

CEQA itself refers to NEPA and provides that an EIS prepared
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Currently, there is a considerable amount of NEPA related litigation.3 6 As one would expect, some of this concerns the scope of
the Act, such as whether NEPA is applicable to continuing projects, 3 7 ongoing projects,3 8 and phased projects. 3 9

Following the

holdings of the federal courts, an EIR is also required under
CEQA for phased projects 40 as well as ongoing projects. 41 A
number of cases have dealt with the retroactivity of NEPA42 and
CEQA. 43 These questions will, of course, be resolved with time as
long as NEPA and CEQA remain substantially unchanged.
However, assuming that a development project is in the planning stages, or otherwise subject to the reporting process, the first

question is whether it will have a significant impact which in
turn governs whether an EIR or EIS will be required.

B. "SignificantImpact'
Under CEQA, an environmental impact report must be prepared

and considered whenever a project carried out or approved by any
under NEPA can be used as part or all of an EIR under CEQA to the
extent it conforms to CEQA. CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 21083.5 (West Supp.
1973).
36. In late 1972 and early 1973, over four opinions per week were being
rendered and literally hundreds of opinions have been issued. See, reported

decisions in ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW REPORTER

for that time.

37. See, Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (MD. Fla. 1972), 4 ERC 1579,
which distinguishes continuing projects as having no termination date
from ongoing projects which do have such a date. See also, Sierra Club v.
Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972), 4 ERC 1686 (ongoing project).
38. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 2 ERG' 1779; Nolop v.
Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
39. See, Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1886; Thomas v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.
Va. 1972), 4 ERC 1468.
40. See, GnDELInEs Pon IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA ENVIONMENTAL QUALiTY ACT OF 1970, Office of the Secretary for Resources (1973),
14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 15000-15166 hereinafter cited as CEQA GumELINES
at § 15069.
41. CEQA GuiDELINEs § 15070; County of Inyo v. Yorty, - Cal. App. 3d
-, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).

42. E.g., see Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), 4 ERC
1350; Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), 4 ERC 1376.
43. San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Ass'n. v. Cent. Permit
Bureau, - Cal. App. 3d -, 106 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1973).

state or local agency has a "significant effect on the environment."'
NEPA requires an environmental impact statement for any "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 45
Under the California statute, the effect is deemed significant if
any of the following exists:
(1) A proposed project has the potential to degrade the quality
of the environment, curtail the range of the environment,
or to achieve short-term, to the disadvantage of long-term,
environmental goals;
(2) The possible effects of the project are individually limited
but cumulatively considerable;
(3) The environmental effects of a project will cause substantial adverse effects on human beings, either directly or in40
directly.
In deciding whether an EIR is to be prepared, the CEQA Guidelines clearly state that one is required if there is likely to be any
"substantial body of opinion" that the impact will be adverse. 4 7
Moreover, the guidelines provide a list of adverse effects which
may be "significant" if they exist. 48 However, since the adverse
effect must be "substantial" or "major" the decision maker is given
49
wide latitude.
It should be pointed out that the Guidelines provide for categorical exemptions in response to the CEQA mandate to do so.50 These
categorial exemptions 51 are subject to periodic review and ad hoc
44.
45.
46.
47.

CAL. PuB. IRES. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1973).
42 U.S.C.§ 44332 (1972).
CAL. PUB. RIES. CODE § 21083 (West Supp. 1973).
CEQA GUiDELINES § 15081 (a).

48. CEQA GUiDELINES § 15081(C). Some examples of consequences which
may have a significant effect on the environment in connection with most
projects where they occur, include the following:

(1) Is in conflict with environmental plans and goals that have
been adopted by the community where the project is to be

located;
(2)
(3)

Has a substantial and demonstrable negative aesthetic effectSubstantially affects a rare or endangered species of animal

or plant, or habitat of such a species;
(4) Causes substantial interference with the movement of any
resident or migratory fish or wildlife species;
(5)

Breaches any published national, state, or local standards re-

lating to solid waste or litter control;
(6) Results in a substantial detrimental effect on air or water

quality, or on ambient noise levels for adjoining areas;
(7) Involves the possibility of contaminating a public water supply system or adversely affecting ground water;

(8) Could cause substantial flooding, erosion or siltation;
(9) Is subject to major geologic hazards.
49. See also, CEQA GUiDELINES § 15082.
50. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21084-21086 (West Supp. 1973).
51. CEQA GUiDELmES §§ 15100-15116.
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changes.

They also, of course, could be challenged if it appears

that they are not within the legislative intent of the Act. 52 Among

the exclusions are ministerial decisions. 53 However, classification
of a decision as ministerial or discretionary can be challenged as
improper. (e.g., a permit for substantial grading is considered
ministerial under some local ordinances, yet if it clearly involved
a significant impact on the environment, its exclusion might be
challenged.)
While California appellate courts have not had the opportunity
to determine the scope of court review on the question of significant impact, under NEPA the federal courts have, in fact, reviewed this administrative determination. Some courts in their
review adhere to the Administrative Practices Act 54 and will reverse the agency's decision only if it is "arbitrary and capricious."5 5
In the 5th Circuit, the "more relaxed rule of reasonableness" is

utilized in reassessing the agency's initial determination since "the
spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision
...were too well shielded from impartial review."'56 Still other
courts will themselves consider a challenged agency decision. In
these jurisdictions the terms "major" and "significantly affecting"
are construed by the court and then applied to the particular project in question. 57 Thus, instead of reviewing the agency's decision, the courts in the last instance are effectively getting to the
merits of that decision. The amount of leeway granted to the
agency in making this initial determination depends, of course, on
the jurisdiction. But, at least some courts are suggesting that the
52. Desert Environment Conservation Ass'n. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n.,
Cal. App. 3d -, -, 106 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (1973).
53. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1973);

§§ 15032, 15113.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a) (1970).

55. Durnford v. Ruckelshaus, -

F. Supp. -

-

CEQA GUIDELIES

(N.D. Cal. 1972), 5 ERC

1007; Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me.

1972); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972), 5 ERC
1217; Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1785.
56. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 471 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973),
4 ERC 1941, 1943; Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, - F.2d - (5th Cir.

1973), 5 ERC 1177.

57. Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971), 3 ERC 1588,
at!md. on alternate holding, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1435;
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1972), 3 ERC 1883.

agency should have less latitude here than in the subsequent determination of whether or not to proceed with the project at hand.
Once the impact is deemed substantial, the next step in the process is the preparation of an environmental impact statement or
report.
C. Responsibility for the Preparationof an EIR
The preparation of the EIR is under the direction of the agency
which has the primary responsibility for carrying out the project.
In the case of private development, it is the agency which has the
principal responsibility for approving the project.58 This designation, also known as the "lead agency" concept, is based on the
assumption that, although many governmental agencies may be
interested in a particular project, only one is ultimately responsible
for it. For example, the Corps of Engineers may plan to build a
flood channel which will affect wildlife, water quality, navigation
and perhaps air pollution. If the Corps is doing the building, it
would be the lead agency. Other agencies may have a regulatory
responsibility, a legislative mandate to cooperate or expertise
which is needed in drawing up the EIS. If so, these other agencies
must participate in preparing the EIS. In addition, the Corps must
seek out the views of interested state and local agencies. 9 The
same situation would obtain with a state project such as a state
highway. Cooperation with other state and local agencies having
jurisdiction by law would be necessary, while those with expertise may be consulted. 0 But, again, the highway is essentially the
responsibility of the Highway Department which would be the
lead agency.
The selection of the agency with the greatest responsibility for
approving the project as a whole may, however, be somewhat more
complicated.

Usually this is the agency with general governmen-

tal powers. Where more than one agency qualifies, the one which
acts first is designated as the lead agency. 61
The actual preparation of the EIS or EIR is done by the lead
agency's staff, by subcontractors, or even by the permit seeker.
However, at least under NEPA, the agency may not utilize a re58. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21067 (West Supp. 1973); CEQA GUIDmLNES
§ 15030.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
60. CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 21104 (West Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
61. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21165 (West Supp. 1973); CEQA GUIDELNES
§ 15065.
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port prepared solely by the party applying for the permit. 62 Under the CEQA Guidelines an approving agency must assure the
accuracy and objectivity of any report submitted independently
83
by the permit seeker.
D.

The Contents of the RIR and EIS

As suggested earlier, the interaction between NEPA and CEQA
arises because the operational language in both is in many particulars identical. The requirements set out below are taken from
CEQA with notations on the differences found in NEPA. Each
EIR or EIS must contain a detailed statement of:
a. The environmental impact of the proposed action.
b. Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
if the proposal is implemented.
c. Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact (not
expressly included in NEPA).
d. Alternatives to the proposed action.
e. The relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity.
f. Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
g. The growth inducing impact of the proposed action (not expressly included in NEPA).64
Upon its completion, the draft EIR or EIS is available to the
appropriate legislature, all interested agencies, citizen groups and
other parties. 65 Any comment or criticism leveled at the report
is to be incorporated into the report, and answered by the lead
agency. The draft document, with the comments and answers
62. Greene County Planning Bd. v. Fed. Power Comm'n., 455 F.2d 412
(1972), 3 ERC 1595, cert. denied - U.S. - (1973), 4 ERC 1752.
63.' CEQA GuiDELn s § 15085 (a).
64. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970). Pending legislation, A.B. 1575, would add to § 21100(c) the following: "including, but not limited to, measures to reduce wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary consumption of energy."
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21105 (West Supp.
1973).

becomes the final document which is considered when the decision
of whether or not to proceed is made. One federal court has
summarized the extent of inclusion necessary to meet the procedural requirements of NEPA as follows:
The 'detailed statement' required by § 102(2) (c) should, at a minimum, contain such information as will alert ... (interested persons), to all known possible environmental consequences of proposed agency action. Where experts, or concerned public or private organizations, or even ordinary lay citizens, bring to the attention of the responsible agency environmental impacts which
they contend will result from the proposed agency action, then the
§ 102 statement should set forth these contentions and opinions
even if the responsible agency finds no merit in them whatsoever.
Of course, the § 102 statement can and should also contain the
opinion of the responsible agency with respect to all such viewpoints. The record should be complete. Then, if the decision
makers choose to ignore such factors, they will be doing so with
their eyes wide open.66

Courts have noted that "[a]t the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law."(6 7 As such, the EIR must be directed in part at the courts so they can do more than simply guess
whether or not there has been substantial compliance with NEPA.08
However, other federal courts indicate that there is more involved than mere disclosure. These courts seem to be saying that
the report cannot simply assume and support the final decision,
but must give some indication that it was used in the decision
making process. For example, one court responded to the defendant's contentions that delay while preparing an EIS would

be costly and hazardous by saying,
If the Act is seen as requiring only full disclosure, it will simply
become a minor nuisance for agencies, imposing one more obligation of paperwork, before they can get on with the projects they
intend to build ....
When defendants ask me to weigh the possibility of increased
cost they are assuming that the projects will be built, and that the
preparation of an impact statement will have no effect whatever
on the decision whether or not to build.69

E. Judicial Scrutiny of the Adequacy of the EIR and EIS
The many cases that have arisen under NEPA demonstrate the
federal courts' insistence that the EIS adequately establish the scientific data which relate to whatever environmental impact the
66. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of the United
States Army, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971), 2 ERC 1260, 1267.
67. Id.
68. Ely v. Veld, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), 3 ERC 1280.
69. Comm. to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn.
1972), 4 ERC 1329, 1333.
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proposed project would have. When presented with expert testimony on an EIS's adequacy, the court may decide directly whether
or not the final statement has adequately incorporated and met
the objections presented by interested parties with regard to fauna,
water quality, geology, history and archeology. 70 Another court
considered the reported facts in detail and made findings on the
effect of a proposed dam on paddlefish, fauna, woodlands and
grasslands, deer, turkey, duck, rabbits, quail, doves and other
small game, pine and oak, timber, Canadian geese and significant
archeological and paleontological sites. 71 The clear implication is
that this court reviewed the evidence and pointed out the specific

omissions in the EIS.
It would appear that anyone, either within or without government, has the court guaranteed right to advance factual data on

environmental impact which must be included within the report
and be considered by the decision maker. (It is, of course, virtually impossible to monitor how much "consideration" has, in
fact, been given to the document.) In addition the EIS must include a detailed projection of long term effects, possible alternafives to the proposal and a comparison of the costs and benefits
72
for each stated alternative.
NEPA requires that an agency must-to the fullest extent possible
under its other statutory obligations-consider alternatives to its
actions which would reduce environmental damage. That principle establishes that consideration of environmental matters must
be more than pro forma ritual. Clearly, it is pointless to 'consider'
environmental costs without also seriously considering action to
avoid them. Such a full exercise of substantive discretion is required at every important,7 3appropriate and nonduplicative stage
of an agency's proceedings.
One court has even gone so far as to suggest that if, in view of the

environmental impacts, the only alternative is to go to Congress
or the President with suggestions for change, that alternative
74
must be considered.
70. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of the United
States Army, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972), 4 ERC 1408.
71. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338

(W.D. Mo. 1972), 4 ERC 1541.

72. Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1785.
73. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 2 ERC 1779, 1796.
74. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972).

When determining whether an environmental impact statement is adequate, the federal courts look for a report which, while
not necessarily including every possible fact advanced by anyone
no matter how competent, demonstrates on its face a good faith
attempt to consider all views that have been advanced. 75 The
test which is used in this instance "is one of good faith objectivity
rather than subjective impartiality."7 6 Another court has stated
that "[t]he adequacy of the research should be judged in light of
the scope of the proposed program and the extent to which existing knowledge raises the possibility of potential adverse environ77
mental effects.1
F. The Role of the Impact Statement
Neither NEPA and CEQA nor their associated guidelines include
any actual statement on the operative effect of an EIR which suggests or finds negative impacts. As is pointed out elsewhere,78

the Legislature could not have intended that CEQA have no effect
and must have contemplated denial or modification of permits
under some circumstances. Certainly the courts have interpreted
both NEPA and CEQA in this way and given them a substantive
role. Dealing with a case brought under NEPA, a federal court
clearly took this point of view by saying:
NEPA was intended to effect substantive changes in decision
making ....

The unequivocable intent of NEPA is to require

agencies to consider and give effect to the environmental goals set
forth in the Act, not just to
file detailed impact studies which will
fill governmental archives. 79
The California courts are insistent that the EIR be considered in

the decision making process. The court in Friends of Mammoth
says that "[o]bviously if the adverse consequences to the environment can be mitigated, or if feasible alternatives are available,
the proposed activity, such as the issuance of a permit, should not
be approved."80
75. E.g., see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 2 ERC 1779.
76. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of the United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1721, 1724.
77. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403
(D.D.C. 1971), 2 ERC 1425, 1426; See also, Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 3 ERC -.
78. Senecker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth-Developers Chase The Will-O'-The-Wisp, 48 CAL. STATE BAR J. 126 (1973).
79. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs. of the United States
Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1721, 1725-6.
80. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d
I as modified at 8 Cal. 3d 247, 263, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761,
771 (1972), 4 ERC 1593, as modified at 4 ERC 1705.
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Certainly the strong language in Friends of Mammoth involves
the state courts in review of the EIR process. "The duty of the
judiciary ...

is to assure that important environmental pur-

poses, heralded in legislative halls, are not lost or misdirected in
the vast hallways of administrative bureaucracy."8'
The requirement that adverse effects on the environment be considered and
used in the agency's decision is supported by the specific language
within the Acts calling for "major consideration."8 2 At the same
time, the guidelines describe the EIR as an "Informational Document." This characterization implies that the EIR has a much

smaller substantive role than it has been given by the court in its
interpretation of the Act. But the guidelines themselves are subject to judicial review to assure conformity to the statutory pur83
pose.
G. The BalancingProcess

Not only must there be a full disclosure of all environmental
impacts as outlined above, but there also must be a systematic
balancing of environmental costs and technical and economic
benefits. The court's role here is to assure that the agency has before it complete information in the form of an EIS and that the
report is used in the decision making process. This is illustrated
in the Calvert Cliffs' decision where the court concluded:
...

NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and informed de-

cisionmaking process and creates judicially enforcible duties. The
reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision
on its merits .

.

. unless it be shown that the actual balance of

costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the decision
was reached procedurally without individualized consideration
and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in
good faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.8 4

81. 8 Cal. 3d at 254, 502 P.2d at 1053, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 765 (emphasis
added).
82. E.g., see, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000(g), 21100 (West Supp. 1973)
and 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
83. Desert Environmental Conservation Ass'n. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n.,
-

Cal. App. 3d -,

106 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (1973).

84. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 2 ERC 1779, 1783 (emphasis
added). In California, pending legislation, A.B. 938, would require an
economic impact report which would be used along with the environmental

impact report in this balancing process.

H. Court Review of the Decision to Proceed

When there is a challenge of the agency's determination on
whether or not to proceed with the project, the federal courts use
differing standards in reviewing this decision. As indicated in the
quote above,8 5 one test is the traditional one for review of agency
decisions, i.e., is the decision supported by the evidence or is it
arbitrary and capricious? Some courts state the standard in terms
of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the decision.8 6 Other courts say that the scope of their review is
limited to procedural matters only.87 However, many courts are
using the "substantial inquiry test."8 8 Here the
[c]ourts are allowed to delve into the decision making process on
their own to determine if the agency's decision was arbitrary and
capricious when viewed in terms of the data and information set
forth in the EIS.89
At least one federal court states that it can review "substantive
agency decisions on the merits." 90 Such a review includes whether
the agency engaged in a good faith consideration of all factors and
whether the balancing of these factors was arbitrary. 91 However, all courts seem to agree that they cannot substitute their
92
judgment for that of the agency.
While it can be argued that NEPA and CEQA are less effective
than they might have been since substantive review on the merits
is limited or even precluded, a growing number of commentators
have suggested that such a review by the courts would be entirely inappropriate because of their technical incompetence.0 8 But,
85. See note 84 supra.
86. Pizitz v. Volpe, - F. Supp.

(M.D. Ala. 1972), 4 ERC 1195.
87. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973),
4 ERC 1933.

88. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, - F. Supp. 5 ERC 1283; Sierra Club v. Froehlke, - F. Supp. -

(W.D. Va. 1973),
(S.D. Tex. 1973),

5 ERC 1033; Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
F. Supp. - (E.D. Tenn. 1973), 5 ERC 1183.

-

89. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, -

F. Supp.

-

(W.D. Va. 1973), 5

ERC 1283, 1286.
90. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of the United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1721.
91. Id. at 300, 4 ERC at 1728.
92. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power

Comm'n., 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), 3 ERC 1233, cert. denied, - U.S. (1972), 4 ERC 1750.
93. E.g., see, Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the
Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de
Grace?, 72 COL. L. REV. 963 (1972); Note, Evolving Judicial Standards
under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Challenge of the
Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592 (1972); Cramton and Boyer, Citizen
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one thing which is becoming clear is that under NEPA and CEQA,

it is not within the purview of the courts to question the wisdom
of the precise decision made by the administrative agency unless
there has been abuse of discretion, since "[t]he NEPA creates no
substative rights in citizens to safe, healthful, productive and culturally pleasing surroundings." 94
I. Summary of CourtReview of Administrative Processes
To summarize, under NEPA and CEQA there are three distinct
stages at which the agency's decision may be challenged and the
courts may be asked to review. The first is the question of whether
the proposed project will have a significant impact on the environment.9 5 Secondly, the courts will review whether the information included within the EIS is adequate and as part of this
they frequently become involved in a very detailed examination of
the actual data included and omitted. This reflects a legislative
determination that there is a need for full disclosure of the bases
supporting administrative decisions. The mandate for full disclosure is a mandate for improved discretionary judgment. The
inevitable assumption is that the citizenry, the legislature and, of
course, the courts can better check potential abuses of discretion
if they have all of the information the agency had before making
the decision in question. 96
Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise? 2 ECOLOGY L. Q. 407
(1972).

94. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, F. Supp. - (E.D. Tenn. 1972), 4 ERC 1892, 1896 quoting from, Upper Pecos

Ass'n. v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971), 3 ERC 1418.

95. Here the courts may use a standard of arbitrary and capricious or a

test of reasonableness or may rule as a matter of law. See text accompany-

ing notes 54-57 supra.
96. It is interesting to note that Professor Davis in his book, DiscaRTIONARY JUSTICE, at 104-107 (1969), suggests a systematic structure for the
exercise of discretion in order to mitigate arbitrariness in administrative
decision making. This would include publication by the agency of its
policy statements and rules so that outsiders dealing with the agency
would have this information. In addition, he advocates that reasoned
administrative opinions justifying discretionary determinations be required
and that these opinions then be treated as open precedents similar to case
law. Ideally, the opinions would have some sort of binding effect to prevent total arbitrariness but would remain flexible so that discretion could
be exercised and total rigidity avoided.

Thirdly, the court may review the actual decision for the possibility of abuse of discretion. 7 To date the federal courts have been

unwilling to reverse the agency determination unless there is a
clear abuse of discretion 8 In California the scope of judicial review is set out by statute and the court is precluded from exercising independent judgment on the evidence. Rather, the court
may only determine whether the act or decision is supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record.0 9 However, it
may be that in California, CEQA can be used in conjunction with
other environmental legislation to allow court review of the substantive decision in certain instances. The first of these possibilities is the new regulations on subdivisions as imposed by A.B.
1301.100 The second is the voter initiative passed in November of
1972 which establishes boards to regulate the development of
coastal property. 01'
IH.

REGULATION OF SUBDIVISIONS PROVIDED BY

A.B. 1301

In California there is a more specialized, yet widely used, type
of land use regulation-subdivision regulations under the Subdivision Map Act. 0 2 Since the State Legislature enacted the Subdivison Map Act,10 3 the doctrine of preemption applies and local governments are restricted in the control they can exert to that allowed by the Act. Prior to A.B. 1301,104 the only way a city or
county could regulate subdivisions was a denial conditioned on design and improvement changes. When these conditions were met,
the subdivider could proceed as far as the Subdivision Map Act
97. Here some courts will use the substantial evidence standard while
others will use the substantial inquiry test. See text accompanying notes
85-92 supra.
98. See, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of the
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1721.

99. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21168 (West Supp. 1973), which was added by

Assembly Bill 889, Act of Dec. 5, 1972, ch. 1154 (1972) Cal. Laws (Deering's) in response to the question of court review raised by Friends of
Mammoth. See also, Seneker, supra note 78 at 129-130.
100. See Sec. III, infra.
101. See Sec. IV, infra.
102. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11535 (West Supp. 1973), defines a subdivision generally as a parcel of land which is divided into five or more
parcels for purpose of sale, lease or financing by any subdivider. The
section also limits that definition in a variety of ways. Section 11540.1
makes it possible for a local government to impose these kinds of regulations on a "subdivision" containing less than five parcels, if it so chooses,
under certain circumstances.
103. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 11500-11641
1973).

104. See note 8, supra.

(West 1964, West Supp.
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was concerned, although he, of course, had to comply with other
zoning ordinances. 10 5
A.

Expansion of the Subdivision Map Act

A.B. 1301 designates additional criteria on which a subdivision
must be denied if certain findings are made. Consider the literal
wording of the statute:
A governing body of a city or county shall deny approval of a
final or tentative subdivision map if it makes any of the following
findings:
(c) That the site is not physically suited for the type of development.
(d) That the site is not physically suitable for the proposed
density of development.
(e) That the design of the subdivision or the proposed improvements are likely to cause substantial environmental damage or
substantially and avoidably injure fish or wildlife or their habitats.
(f) That the design of the subdivision or the type of improvements is likely to cause serious public health problems.' 0 6
These criteria are explicit and appear to express a legislative
mandate that subdivision proposals are to be denied, not only for
the traditional reasons, but also for reasons related to environmental sensitivity. Particularly with an area such as a lagoon,
any substantial and permanent development using fill is likely
to require one of the stated findings thus precluding any kind of
development. However, it is debatable whether or not the findings on environmental or health hazards set forth in sections (e)
and (f) have to be made. There is a mandate that the governmental body "shall deny approval"; 10 7 there is no express mandate to make the findings which would support such a denial.
One possible literal interpretation of the statute is that "if" the
105. A significant change brought about by A.B. 1301 is that zoning
decisions must now conform to the general plan. See, Comment, "Zoning
Shall be Consistent with the General Plan"-A Help or a Hindrance to
Planning,10 SAN DIEao L. REV. 901 (1973).
106. CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 11549.5 (West Supp. 1973).
107. Another source of mandated denial is the open space plan. See,
CAL. Gov. CoDE § 65567 (West Supp. 1973). Open space plans may include
lands for a number of reasons, among them, the land's environmental
sensitivity.

agency elects to make findings and such findings are negative, then
denial of the proposal follows. Thus, decision makers who are environmentally concerned have a means by which they can mitigate
or prevent ecological damage; those who are not so concerned can
avoid the issue entirely merely by not making any findings. Needless to say, much of the efficacy of the law could be obviated if,
in fact, this interpretation is adopted by the courts.
On the other hand, one can argue that it is more consistent with
the overall purpose of A.B. 1301 to construe the statute as mandating that the governmental agency make express findings. If
these findings are negative, then denial is also mandated. This
interpretation of the statute does not remove much discretionary
power from the local decision maker since in the past denial of
subdivisions could only be conditional and could only be predicated on a change in design or improvement. Rather this construction of the statute would further assure implementation of the
Legislature's intent to prevent irreversible environmental damage.
When findings are made, whether they be mandated or not,
there is also the question of whether they need to be in writing.
The prevailing notion is that written findings are required in
formal hearings to aid possible judicial review.1 08 The necessity
of written findings in informal hearings is less than clear. However, if the findings from the EIR can be substituted for the findings necessary for A.B. 1301109 the problem becomes moot, since the
court in Friends of Mammoth' 0 held that findings from the EIR
are the equivalent of any required findings of fact. On the other
hand, if the EIR cannot be used in conjunction with A.B. 1301, the
court, in the absence of express findings, will assume that the findings necessary to support the decision were made."'
B. The RelationshipBetween A.B. 1301 and CEQA
Section II reviewed the status of the law and the interpretation
by the courts of the environmental quality acts, NEPA and CEQA.
With A.B. 1301 we have another expression of environmental concern in legislation which is applicable to the specialized area of
subdivisions. Subdivision approval specifically requires an EIR
108. See, DAvis, ADmnusTRAIVE LAw TREATISE, §§ 16.01, 16.02 and 16.05
(1958).
109. This question is discussed in greater detail infra.
110. 8 Cal. 3d 1, as modified at 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1972), 4 ERC 1593 as modified at 4 ERC 1705.
111. Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Ass'n. v. Bd. of Permit Appeals, 66
Cal. 2d 767, 427 P.2d 810, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1967).
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when other criteria are met.112 Is there a relationship between
the two? More specifically, can the findings of the EIR be used as
the findings on which a denial under A.B. 1301 is predicated, and
if so, what is the specific interrelationship?
It is easy to say that adverse environmental effects presented in
the EIR can be substituted for the requirement of "substantial environmental damage" in subsection (e) and that, consequently,
denial is mandated." 3 Courts could review the record and reverse when necessary with no need to consider whether or not
there has been an abuse of discretion. But there are various reasons why that direct association is to be questioned.

One problem is that there is no reason to think that the word

"significant" as it relates to "impact"" 4 has a one-to-one relationship to the use of the word "substantial" as it relates to "damage".
The former includes both beneficial and detrimental environmental effects at least under NEPA. The CEQA guidelines indicate
that only adverse effects are to be considered. 115 However, an
EIR is desirable to assure that consideration is given to the best alternative even if all are good. In addition, the decision that an EIR
is required is based on the conclusion that there will probably be a
significant impact. After the study is done, there may, in fact, be
none, or the plan may be modified to avoid them." 6 Just because a project is deemed "significant," thus requiring an EIR,
112. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1973).
113. In Secs. (e) and (f) it appears that it is the design of the subdivision rather than the fact of development that mandates denial. Secs. (c)
and (d) refer to the unsuitability of this particular site for this particular
type of development. Presumably situations can arise where no design
is suitable for a site or no design sufficiently mitigates environmental
damage to be less than "substantial." There will be no direct prohibition
against use of the land, but as successive alternatives are rejected, it
will eventually become clear that all proposals will fail. This will give
rise to the possibility of inverse condemnation as discussed in the text
accompanying Sec. V, infra, where it is concluded that such right does not
exist.
114. See text accompanying notes 44-57 supra.
115. CEQA GuImIs § 15081 (a).
116. This, of course, ultimately becomes a philosophical problem. There
is virtually nothing that can be done which does not affect the environment. And, whether this is "adverse" depends on how one looks at it.
Environmentalists may feel that it is "adverse" to destroy coyotes; chicken
farmers may term this result "beneficial."

does not necessarily mean that there would be a negative finding
requiring denial under this section of A.B. 1301.
The next clause of the same section provides that there shall be
a denial if the subdivision "avoidably injures fish or wildlife or
their habitat."'1 17 As was pointed out previously, the environmental impact report must consider alternatives to the proposed
project including the possibility of no development. If the development involves injury to fish or wildlife, that fact must be
brought out in the EIR and, as we have seen, if such an omission
is challenged, the court on review will make sure that it, as well
as viable alternatives, are so presented." 8 Once a reasonable alternative is demonstrated, there is the possibility that the injury
is avoidable. 119 If the EIR presents these alternatives and it
appears that one is "better" in an environmental sense than the
proposal being offered as far as the fish and wildlife are concerned,
approval of such a subdivision appears to present an irreconcilable conflict-whether or not findings under A.B. 1301 are mandated and whether or not these findings are written. That is, the
agency has adopted an EIR which contains superior alternatives
for preservation of wildlife; approval of the project in effect indicates that there are no superior alternatives. The possibilities
open to the court when presented with such a situation are explored further in the next section.
In addition, if denial is required when injury to wildlife is avoidable, this suggests that the project would be approved if the injury were unavoidable. The use of the disjunctive in this subsection suggests that other kinds of substantial environmental damage must be denied under any circumstances while injury to fish
and wildlife is precluded only if it is avoidable. Otherwise, the
latter clause would be subsumed under the former and would
become meaningless.
The following section of the statute also lends itself to the use of
the EIR. This section states that the city or county shall deny
approval of a subdivision if it finds that "the design of the subdivision or the type of improvements is likely to cause serious public health problems."'1 20 CEQA clearly contemplates the
117. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11549.5(e) (West Supp. 1973).
118. See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
119. Needless to say, an alternative might inflict more injury or the same
amount of injury as the particular project being proposed.
120. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11549.5(f) (West Supp. 1973). Pending
legislation A.B. 21 would require a certificate from the local health officer
that all environmental conditions have been met.
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consideration of factors such as air pollution, water pollution,
waste disposal and flood or earthquake potential within the ER.
That is, if these things pertain to the particular project, they must
be considered as part of the environmental document.
Thus, it appears that the use of the findings in the EIR as the
findings under A.B. 1301 is not inappropriate. Certainly the information therein is relevant to the type of finding which is to be
made under A.B. 1301 although it is doubtful that the two requirements of "substantial" and "significant" are synonymous. However, since "significant" includes both beneficial and adverse impacts at least under NEPA it would seem to be the broader of the
two. Thus, although not all "significant" impacts would be "substantial" one could certainly argue that all "substantial" environmental damage would also be "significant" under the requirements of CEQA. If this is true, then for every subdivision, whether
the findings are mandated or not, they should be available because
of the EIR prepared under CEQA.

C. Scope of JudicialReview
This is being written before A.B. 1301 becomes effective and
there is, of course, no judicial guidance as to what may be the
scope and nature of judicial review when decisions under this law
are challenged. However, since review of agency decisions, quasi
judicial and local legislative decisions are guided by the standard
of abuse of discretion, it is assumed that decisions made under
A.B. 1301 will be judged in the same manner. If, in fact, the EIR
can be substituted for the findings necessary for denial under A.B.
1301 presumably judicial review of these findings would be the
1 21
same as under CEQA.
But whether or not the EIR is permitted to be an integral part
of the decision under A.B. 1301, if it is extant, what is its role in
the subdivision approval process? Within the EIR there must be a
listing of all adverse environmental effects. The report must describe which adverse factors can be reduced to an insignificant
level and explain why the project is being proposed if, in fact, the
121. Of course, the Calif. courts have not yet considered the scope of re-

view for findings under CEQA and this article suggests that they will follow the federal courts' interpretation of NEPA because of the close similarity between the two acts. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.

adverse effects cannot be eliminated. 122 It is difficult to see how
an application for a subdivision can be approved when negative
facts are included in the EIR. Such a decision could only be regarded as an abuse of discretion on the part of the agency considering the proposal. The same conclusion follows when there is
consideration given to the impact of the project on fish and wildlife and alternative proposals are contained in the EIR. 123 It would
seem that at least in these two instances denial of the project
would be required whether or not findings under A.B. 1301 are
mandatory and whether or not they are written. It is the irreconcilable conflict between the adoption of the EIR, which contains
documentation of adverse, unavoidable injury to the environment,
and the subsequent approval of the subdivision which forms the
basis for the abuse of discretion, not the presence or absence of
"findings."
In addition, as shown by the cases under NEPA, some courts,
while adhering to the standard of abuse of discretion, do so expansively.1 24 If courts are willing to adopt the same attitude toward subdivision control, and there is no reason to expect that they
will not since the general concern of preserving the environment is
the same, they may be willing to use the "substantial inquiry" test.
Then, if the approval or the denial of a particular subdivision is
challenged, the court will look into the decision making procedure,
whether or not findings are made and whether or not they are used
in the decision making process. If no findings have been made or
the findings are deemed inadequate, the court can then enjoin
further activity until the findings are made or improved.
Of course, under A.B. 1301 a denial is predicated on "substantial
environmental damage" or "serious health problems." Although
the court may mandate findings or further findings, it is questionable whether it will undertake consideration of the "seriousness"
of the impact. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the
balancing required by NEPA and CEQA 125 can be done without
giving some kind of quantitative weight to the adverse effects as
122. CEQA GuiDEMI ES § 15143 (b).
123. Another reflection of the legislative concern about the environment
is another section of A.B. 1301 which requires that tentative maps for remote subdivisions, as defined by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11000.5, must be
submitted to the office of intergovernmental management for an environmental evaluation. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11550.1. The same kinds of
considerations would be applicable if a negative environmental impact were
found by this office and the subdivisions were approved by another agency.
124. See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
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well as the advantages to be gained. This might provide an index
to "seriousness" since, under A.B. 1301, there is arguably no need
for a balancing-only for a finding. In addition, there is doubt as
to whether "seriousness" can be equated with "substantial" or with
"significant." On the other hand, the courts have gotten into the
question of cost effectiveness where it is mandated under NEPA,

and have insisted that there be a good faith determination as to
what the cost benefits are.12 61 Thus, they might also require a
good faith determination of how serious possible environmental effects might be.
This analysis assumes that there is no "balancing" under A.B.
1301. Actually NEPA and CEQA themselves do not expressly include the balancing requirement. Rather, the federal courts, at
least, have inserted the balancing process into the express terms
of NEPA. This was the courts' method of assuring some results from the Act, since there is nothing expressed about how
the reporting process is to be used in making decisions. But
A.B. 1301 unequivocally gives to the environmental assessment a

unique and definitive role, and if literally applied leaves no room
for a judicial gloss permitting a trade-off of environmental costs

for social or economic values through a balancing process. This
is but an application of the general principal that legislation
which is clear on its face will be accepted literally without looking
behind the words to try to find a legislative intent.
Thus, in summary, it appears that whether the findings on
which a denial can be based under A.B. 1301 must be made, and
whether these findings must be in writing are debatable. However,
where an EIR is required because the impact is deemed "significant," denial of the proposed subdivision in some cases may be
mandatory. This situation would occur where unavoidable, substantial environmental damage which cannot be mitigated is reported in the EIR, or when alternatives generating less damage
than the proposed development to fish and wildlife were included in the EIR. In both of these instances, to grant permission
to subdivide would be directly contradictory to the findings under
CEQA and would be an abuse of discretion. In addition, the courts
126. See, Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972), and the cases cited therein.

may be willing to apply, as they have in some instances under
NEPA, a liberal interpretation of the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing these agency decisions. If so, those persons who
are concerned about the environment and its preservation will
have a more effective way of checking decisions of agency officials whom they feel have been less than sensitive to environmental concerns. On the other hand, the landowner with environmentally sensitive land who is ultimately precluded from any kind of
development will seek to recover damages through inverse condemnation or to have the decision set aside. Before getting to
that particular question, however, there is another piece of specialized environmental legislation, the Coastal Zone Initiative,
which can be related to CEQA and to environmentally sensitive
areas.
IV.

MANDATED PERmIT DEiALs UNDER TE

COASTAL ZONE INITUA

E

A. Policy and the Permit Process of the Coastal Commissions
On November 7, 1972, the voters of California adopted the Coastal
Zone Conservation Act (CZCA), popularly known as the Coastal
Zone Initiative or Proposition 20.127 This Act establishes a State
Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (CZCC) and six regional
commissions. The initiative provides for the creation of a long

range conservation plan in the coastal zone, 128 which is to be
submitted to the Legislature in 1976. However, the primary concern in this article is with those portions of the initiative that
grant permit issuing powers to the regional commissions and those
portions which articulate the policies that are to be reflected in
the permit process.
The Coastal Zone Initiative is strongly worded from an environmental point of view. The policy provisions establish the value
of the coastal zone as a natural resource that consists of a delicately balanced ecosystem, and state: ".

.

. it is the policy of the

127. California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUB. REs.
CoDE §§ 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1973).
128. The coastal zone is defined as: ". . . that land and water area of the
state of California from the border of the State of Oregon to the border of
the Republic of Mexico, extending seaward to the outer limit of the state
jurisdiction, including all islands within the jurisdiction of the state, and
extending inland to the highest elevation of the nearest coastal mountain
range, except that in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego Counties, the
inland boundary of the coastal zone shall be the highest elevation of the
nearest coastal mountain range or five miles from the mean high tide line,
whichever is the shorter distance." CAL. PuB. Rzs. CODE § 27100 (West Supp.
1973).
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state to preserve, protect, and, where possible, to restore the resources of the coastal zone for the enjoyment of the current and
succeeding generations...-129

Further indications of the environmental orientation of the Act
are found in the sections that establish objectives of the coastal
zone conservation plan. Included among the objectives are the
restoration of the quality of the coastal zone environment, the
maintenance of optimum populations of living organisms, the
utilization of sound conservation principles in allocating coastal
zone resources and the avoidance of irreversible commitments of
80
coastal zone resources.
As previously mentioned, the initiative establishes a system of
interim permit controls to be operative until the coastal zone initiative terminates after the adjournment of the 1976 Legislature. The
permit area is that portion of the coastal zone lying between the
seaward limit of the jurisdiction of the State and 1,000 yards landward from the mean high tide line, subject to the exclusion of
certain land in the San Francisco area.1' 1 While the ultimate
definition of mean high tide line, and thus, the precise location of
the landward boundary of the permit area, will undoubtedly be
subject to further refinement through Attorney General's opinions and court cases, this issue is not of immediate concern to this
article. Rather, the focus here is on those sections of the Coastal
Zone Initiative that define the situations in which permits are to
be approved or denied within the permit area as it is eventually
defined. The key provision for this purpose is the section which
states:
No permit shall be issued unless the regional commission has first
found both of the following:
(a) That the development will not have any substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect.
(b) That the development is consistent with, the findings and
declarations set forth in Sections 27001 and with the objectives set forth in Section 27302.
129. CAL. Pus. REs. CODE § 27001 (West Supp. 1973).
130. CAL. Pus. REs. CODE § 27302 (West Supp. 1973).
131. There is also an extension of the permit area to include a 1,000 foot
strip of land surrounding any non-tidal body of water which lies partially
within the permit area. Certain stabilized and developed areas are excluded, as well as other limitations not important for our purposes. CAL.
PuB. REs. CODE § 27104 (West Supp. 1973).

The 132
applicant shall have the burden of proof on all issues.

The permits referred to are those which pertain to "any development within the permit area."'1 3 Normally, a majority vote of
the regional commission is required for permit approval, but the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the regional commission is required for certain developments' 3 4 including: alterations in any
bay, estuary, salt marsh, river mouth, slough or lagoon; developments on any beach or other areas usable for public recreation; any
developments which would reduce or impose restrictions upon
public access to tidal and submerged lands, beaches and the mean
high tide line where there is no beach; development which would
substantially interfere with or detract from the line of sight toward the sea from the state highway nearest the coast; or any
development which would adversely affect water quality, existing
areas of open water free of visible structures, existing and potential commercial fisheries, or agricultural uses of land which are
existing on the effective date of this division. 3 5
It is important to note that the development for which permits
must be obtained is defined in a very comprehensive manner and
includes almost any kind of building within the area, with some

exceptions for relatively minor improvements or repairs of existing
structures.3 6 The list of items requiring two-thirds vote of the
regional commission demonstrates that the Initiative is directed
at environmentally sensitive land use decisions. This is even more
dramatically demonstrated by the express provision requiring de37
nial unless certain findings are made.
Permit denial is required upon the finding of adverse environmental consequences, demonstrating that the Initiative reflects
many of the identical policies expressed by CEQA. A combination
of the strong environmental orientation of the policy and plan provisions, as well as the permit provisions, could support a dramatic
use of the Coastal Zone Initiative comparable to the federal use of
NEPA and California's initial use of CEQA.138 The relevant in132. CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 27402 (West Supp. 1973); see also, text accompanying notes 129 and 130 supra, discussing CAL. PB. RES. CODE §§ 27001,
27302 (West Supp. 1973).
133. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27400 (West Supp. 1973). See also, CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 27103 which defines "development".
134. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 27400, 27401 (West Supp. 1973).
135. CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 27401 (West Supp. 1973).
136. CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 27405 (West Supp. 1973).
137. See, note 132 supra, concerning CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 27402 (West
Supp. 1973).

138. See, Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8
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quiry then becomes whether the Coastal Zone Conservation Act
alone, or a combination of the Act and CEQA, provide an adequate
basis for substantive review of permit approval by courts. The
answer depends upon the applicability of CEQA to the Coastal
Zone Initiative, as well as a more extensive analysis of the Initiative itself.
B. CEQA and the Coastal Zone Initiative-A Basis
for JudicialReview
Ascertaining whether CEQA is applicable to the commissions
created by the Coastal Zone Initiative is not without difficulty.
The initiative power is derived from the Constitution.'8 9 An initiative is superior to any subsequent legislation in that it can only
be changed by initiative unless a provision for legislative change
is included. 140 As a matter of fact, the Coastal Zone Initiative
provides for legislative change, but only by two-thirds vote of the
Legislature, and only to better effectuate the objectives of Sections
27001 and 27302.141
Although CEQA had been effective for some time, no reference
to it is made in the Initiative. In addition, CEQA was substantially expanded after the electorate had approved the Initiative,
thus raising the problem of whether CEQA is "prior" or "subsequent" legislation. If CEQA applies to the Coastal Zone Initiative,
does it effect changes in the latter thus requiring a two-thirds
vote? One can speculate on the sequence of events giving rise to
this confusion. The Legislature passed CEQA which most persons
believed applied only to public governmental projects. Thus, the
drafters of the Initiative may have omitted any reference to CEQA
since the latter would include coastal public development and the
former would cover private projects. Friends of Mammoth was
decided on September 21, 1972 and modified on November 6, 1972
Cal. 3d 1, as modified at 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761

(1972), 4 ERC 1593, as modified at 4 ERC 1705; County of Inyo v. Yorty,

- Cal. App. 3d -, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973), and the discussion in Sec. II,

supra.

139. CAL. CoNsT., art. 4,
140. CAL. CONST., art. 4,

§ 1.
§ 24 (c).

141. Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, § 5 quoted at CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 27000 (West Supp. 1973); see also, text accompanying notes 129 and
130 supra, discussing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27001, 27302 (West Supp. 1973).

and extended CEQA's applicability to private projects. The next
day the Coastal Zone Initiative was approved by the voters.142
Then, in response to the court's decision in Friends of Mammoth
the Legislature substantially expanded CEQA. In so doing, it appears that the California Legislature perceived CEQA as applying
to the regional commissions since it provided that where a conflict
between CEQA and the Initiative arises, the coastal initiative shall
control. 14 3 However, as will be pointed out in more detail later,
the guidelines implementing the Initiative make no reference to
CEQA nor do they expressly require an EIR.
Whether the courts will decide that CEQA should apply to the
Coastal Zone permit procedure is, of course, unknown. However,
there are strong reasons to support the thesis that CEQA and its
reporting process do apply. First, CEQA is literally made applicable to the coastal commissions. CEQA provides that "(a) ...
boards and commissions shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by
contract, and certify the completion of an environmental impact
report on any project they ... approve which may have a significant effect on the environment."' 4 4 The unanswered question is
whether this provision of CEQA was prior or subsequent to the
Initiative and, thus, whether it applies to this particular commission. If CEQA applies by its own terms, the question becomes
whether or not its provisions are consistent or inconsistent with
provisions of the Coastal Zone Conservation Act.
The very extensive parallelism of the policies expressed by both
statutes lends credence to the assertion that they are consistent.
Even though the Coastal Zone Initiative is aimed primarily at the
142. The determination of legislative intent for an initiative is essentially different than for other legislation. In the latter case, there is a recognized system, including committee reports and legislative hearings, which
is relied on by the legislators for detailed and precise interpretation of the
sponsor's intent. In contrast, the intent of the drafters of an initiative is
not necessarily the intent of those citizens voting on the bill. If there is
any external legislative intent to an initiative, it would seem to be the material supplied to all the voters as part of the initiative process. In the case
of the Coastal Zone Initiative, these materials, including the analysis of the
legislative council, the cost analysis of the legislative analyst, and the arguments for and against the proposition as well as the rebuttals thereto, say
nothing one way or the other about the applicability of CEQA. See, Proposed Amendments to Constitution, Propositions and Proposed Laws Together with Arguments, General Election, Tue. Nov. 7, 1972, compiled by
George H. Murphy, Legislative Counsel, and distributed by Edmond G.
Brown, Jr., Secretary of State.
143. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21174 (West Supp. 1973), added by Stats.
1972, ch. 1154, p. -, § 16, urgency, eff. Dec. 5, 1972.
144. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1973).
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natural resources of the coast, 14 5 both Acts express a similar concern with the ecological balance, the enjoyment and protection of
natural resources, the protection of wildlife, the need for preservation of the environment, the responsibilities to present and future
generations, the need to protect public health, safety and welfare,
the need for understanding environmental problems, management needs and the necessity of coordination among government
agencies.
In addition, both Acts contain provisions requiring a large
measure of public input. The Initiative requires public hearings
both when permit applications and when the various elements of
the coastal conservation plan are considered. While CEQA does
not expressly require public hearings, the guidelines require all
agencies preparing EIR's to allow for public input in the reporting
process. 140 Thus, both Acts express strong environmental concern and attempt to provide for large injections of citizen and expert participation in their decisional processes. However, even
though the environmental philosophies of both Acts are similar,
each has an essentially different emphasis and, thus, they may be
inconsistent. When it comes to implenentation of the philosophies,
different behavior is mandated under each act. CEQA, as has already been pointed out, is an attempt to provide full disclosure of
all significant environmental impacts of proposed projects. 1 47

A

careful balancing of these impacts and weighing of alternatives is
required.148 The coastal commissions, on the other hand, are

charged with an affirmative duty to protect the coastal zone from
development that would have an adverse environmental or ecological effect on coastal resources. The permit system mandates denial, not discussion, if a significant adverse environmental impact
149
would result.
Thus, when a city agency, for instance, prepares an environmental impact report, it is under an obligation to include all adverse
145. Compare, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27001, 27302 (West Supp. 1973)
with CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000, 21001 (West Supp. 1973).
146. Compare, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27420(b), 27320(b) (West Supp.
1973) with, CEQA GuIDELmEs § 15164.
147. See, text accompanying Sec. H, supra.
148. See, text accompanying note 84 supra.
149. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 27402 (West Supp. 1973).

and favorable environmental impacts; 15 0 and it has a responsibil-

ity on the face of the report to articulate a balancing process which
shows the tradeoffs. The city is in a position to effectuate a good
faith compliance with the environmental impact report process
by showing, on the one hand, that there may be adverse impact
upon, for example, wildlife or vegetation or some other natural resource, but to say at the same time there is a need for further
housing, for jobs, etc. After this balancing, it might be completely
appropriate to go ahead and issue the permit. 151 However, the
regional commissions have a more limited call, in that, given a
showing of adverse effect, they simply must deny the permit.
Thus, the balancing aspect of the EIR is not really appropriate to
the regional commissions, but certainly the fact finding and reporting part of the EIR process is extremely important to them.
Another distinction can be made here. The Coastal Zone Commission has an environmental responsibility to the natural resources of the coastline as such. However, the environmental impact report responsibility extends to such things as the growth inducing impact of the proposed project. 15 2 Insofar as the general
EIR process deals with the effect of population upon the environment, the Coastal Zone Commission may be less concerned with
that particular part of the EIR process. The part that is of concern to the Commission is the part that relates to the sandy
beaches, the rocky beaches, the cliffs, the purity of water along
the coast, the preservation of wildlife habitat, the preservation of
vegetation that is peculiar to the coast, etc. This is a slightly more
limited call and would cause the Coastal Zone Commission to be
interested in a slightly different EIR.
In addition, there is a distinction in the jurisdictions of the

coastal commissions and that of the agencies reporting under
CEQA. The commissions cut across land which may be under the
immediate regulatory supervision of one or more counties, one or
more relatively large cities, and some very small communities.
In some communities the EIR process may not be very refined or
efficient. The regional commissions, however, are only six in number and each commission has a responsibility for a very long expanse of coastline. From this point of view, the EIR of the commissions should be expected to take into account the impact of a
proposed development up and down the coastline, and perhaps
150. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
151. Unless, of course, A.B. 1301 mandates denial. See generally, Sec.
I, supra.
152. CAL. PuB. R.s. CODE § 21100 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
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even upon the entire coast of California. The review process at
least should have a statewide perspective. This suggests that the
environmental interests considered in some locally prepared EIRs
might be narrower in scope of environmental interests than those
which the regional commissions were designed to protect.
A final problem in arguing that CEQA applies to the coastal
commissions is that the preparation of the EIR is charged to a
"lead agency." The lead agency is supposed to be the agency with
"....

the principle responsibility for carrying out or approving a

project .
-.'3 The lead agency concept as it is derived under
NEPA is based primarily upon the assumption that a variety of
governmental agencies is interested in the project, but that only
one is actually carrying it out. 154 But in the present situation
the decision by a city to approve a zoning change within the jurisdiction of a regional commission, for example, is essentially an independent and complete regulatory responsibility as far as the

city is concerned. When the commission is called into the act, it
makes an independent judgment about the specific permit which is
requested. It is not a question of a single agency carrying out a
project, nor is there any really clear way of determining the
agency with the principal responsibility.
Of course, one could argue that the regional commissions are
the entities which have the stronger responsibility in the environmental area in view of the fact that their role is essentially an
environmental protection responsibility. Thus, their powers are
solely directed at preserving the environment and in regard to that
role and its interrelationship with the EIR process, the commissions are the more significant agency. This argument is even
stronger when one realizes that local government agencies already had the power to effectuate many of the policies expressed
by the Coastal Initiative. The implication is that the electorate
was not fully satisfied with the diversity of results that came from
a large number of different governmental entities along the coastline. Thus, by establishing six region-wide commissions and giving them relatively absolute power, it appears that they do have
the primary responsibility for approving development which may
153. CEQA GumnnmFs § 15030.
154. See, text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.

have a significant impact upon the environment in the permit
area. The inconsistencies outlined above indicate that the lead
agency concept in this particular situation may be unworkable
and inappropriate.
The philosophical consistency of CEQA and the Coastal Zone
Conservation Act, on the one hand, compared with the lack of
clearly articulated intent that CEQA apply and other problems
discussed above result in an impasse. It is this writer's belief
that a court case will be required to resolve the problem of the
applicability of CEQA to the coastal commissions. In fact, it appears that as of this writing the question has been finessed by
those responsible for the procedural implementation of the Coastal
Initiative.155 Until the question of the applicability of CEQA is
answered, a combination of the strong policies of the Initiative and
staff reports prepared for the regional commissions represent the
basis for judicial review of permit approval. It is to these reports
and policies that we now turn in order to ascertain the nature of
the information they provide for commission findings and judicial
review.
The interim regulations for the regional and state commissions
make only one specific reference to environmental impact reports
when they ask each permit applicant: "has an environmental impact statement (sic) been prepared for the project? If so, attach a
copy to this application. If not, please so indicate."'5
The regulations themselves do not reflect the aura of strong environmental protection that is found in the basic Act. However, they do
point out that the regulations are not an attempt to reproduce the
15 7
definitions and policies of the provisions found in the Act.
When the interim regulations and the permit application are reviewed in some detail, it seems that the authors intended to
provide a relatively summary reporting procedure which would
bear no relationship to CEQA as it is actually supposed to be carried out.
The permit application itself mirrors much of the language of

the Coastal Initiative. There are a series of questions apparently
designed to ascertain whether the applicant feels his project is a
155. See, text accompanying notes 160-161 infra.
156. Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, Application For Permit,
§ 6, par. 23.
157. Interim Regulations, California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission and Regional Commissions, chapter 1, art. 1, par. 1 (hereinafter
cited as INTsEnv REGULATiONS).
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majority vote or two-thirds vote project.158 Another section of
the application, reflecting the Act's requirement that the comnmissioners find that no substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect will result from the development, reproduces the policy
sections of the Act and asks the applicant whether his project will
be consistent with these requirements.1 5 9
The Coastal Zone Initiative reporting is accomplished in part by
provisions which require that the filed application shall be fairly
summarized, presenting the applicant's views and including the
staff recommendation.' 60
Moreover, communications received
from other persons are to be available in the commission offices
and are to be distributed to all commission members. 16' If there
is a sizable number of similar communications, they need not be
reproduced and may be distributed to the commissioners in the
form of a list of all persons who have sent similar communications
along with the substance of the communications. 6 2 Certainly
this makes available the type of data found within an EIR that
would be available from the applicant and from citizens' groups.
However, the regulations do not call for contributions from all interested governmental entities nor do they require the kind of
staff review or comprehensive inclusion made necessary under
CEQA. In short, the permit application and regulations elicit some
of the same information that would be contained in an EIR, but
they do not carry the same kind of mandate to search out in-

formation.
Following public hearings with an opportunity for everyone to
be heard, a staff report is to be prepared by the executive direc-

tor.103 The regulations governing the staff report are relatively
simple and, again, do not carry with them the mandate for a broad
inclusion as is found under CEQA. There is a requirement that
the executive director recommend whether the regional commis158. Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, Application For Permit,
§ III. See also, note 135 supra, concerning CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27401
(West Supp. 1973).
159. Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, Application For Permit,
Section V.
160. INTERIM
161. INRIM

REGULATIONS,

Article 7.

280.
162.
281.
163. INTERIM REGULATIONS, § 310.
REGULATIONS, §
INTERIM REGULATIONS, §

sion should approve the project or not.1 4 When all is said and
done, the regulations provide an alternative system to reporting
by the public, the staff, and the applicant. But, they do not begin

to provide a basis for the equivalent of an EIR or EIS as discussed
earlier. Thus, the staff reports and recommendations, the information produced by the hearings, and presumably any independently produced EIR provides the basis for the commissioners'
required findings of fact prior to permit approval. This information in turn represents the central body of information upon
which a court would have to rely when engaging in any substantive review of contested permit approvals.
C. Judicial Review of Contested Coastal Zone Permits
The Coastal Zone Initiative created six regional commissions and
one state-wide commission with reviewing power over certain
regional commission decisions. 165 The state commission may
decline to review regional decisions that raise no substantial issues.
Otherwise the "appeal" will be a de novo public hearing.1 00 The
regulations set forth some of the matters which may be considered
substantial, including whether the project is a majority or twothirds vote project and whether uniformity of precedent throughu0 7
out the coastal zone is required or other "appropriate reasons.'
The nature of issues that are deemed "substantial" will no doubt
be refined over time. However, the question of permit approval
or denial is certainly substantial, and this decision is central to
both the permit process of the Coastal Zone Initiative and the
thesis of this article.
The Initiative gives the right of appeal to any person aggrieved
by approval of a permit. 1 68 This section of the Act states: "An
applicant, or any person aggrieved by approval of a permit by the
regional commission may appeal to the commission (emphasis
added)," and seems to say that only project approvals can be appealed to the state commission. Such an interpretation creates an
obvious equal protection argument on the part of permit seekers
and is eliminated by the guidelines which state that an applicant
aggrieved by denial or by approval may appeal. 69 The guidelines further provide that any person aggrieved by a decision of
164. INTERIM REGULATIONS, § 310 (e).
165. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27423 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
166. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27423 (c)(West Supp. 1973).

167.

INTERIM REGULATIONS,

§

704.

168. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27423 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
169. INTERIM REGULATIONS, § 700.
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the regional or state commission shall have a right to judicial review.170 Thus, the following procedural steps would occur prior
to judicial review. First, a regional commission would approve or
deny a permit. Following this, any person aggrieved by this grant
or denial of permit would appeal to the state commission, and a
new public hearing would take place. Only after a decision by
the state commission not to reverse the regional commission's
grant or denial of a permit, would judicial review follow.
An ancilliary question that could be presented for judicial review
is whether the project requires a majority or two-thirds vote.
Depending upon the make-up of the regional commissions, this
question could be crucial. While the Act requires each commissioner to be "exceptionally well qualified" to decide the environmental questions raised by permit applications, 171 the Act in no
way requires each commissioner to have a marked pro-environmental viewpoint. The practical result could very well be that
regional commissions could be somewhat equally divided between
individuals who, though well qualified, have a somewhat pro-development or pro-environmental viewpoint. This would mean
that an applicant could be virtually assured of approval if his development were a majority vote project, but substantially less sure
of approval if it were a two-thirds vote project.
Thus, the factual question of whether, for instance, a proposed
development would reduce the size of a beach or would impose restrictions upon public access to tidal lands172 would determine
the vote required for project approval and, as discussed, could be
the most critical factor affecting ultimate project approval. The
criteria for determining whether a project is one that requires twothirds vote are reasonably well-defined and unambiguous. 173 They
actually represent quite narrowly defined factual issues such as
what is a "beach," or what is a "tideland." These decisions probably can be made at the staff level. However, the Interim Regulations describe them as possible "substantial issues" which can
be appealed to the state commission. 74 Because these issues
170. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27424 (West Supp. 1973).
171. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27220 (West Supp. 1973).
172. See, CAL. Pun. RES. CODE § 27401 (West Supp. 1973), and text accompanying note 135 supra.
173. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27401 (West Supp. 1973),
174. INTEmM REGULATIONS, § 704.

are narrowly defined by the Act, and because they involve environmentally sensitive areas, they seem readily susceptible to the
type of judicial review suggested here. For example, suppose a
staff report on a project recognized a potential decrease in the
size of a public beach or substantial public input in the staff report or an EIR disclosed such a diminution, and the regional
commission determined the project to be one requiring a majority rather than a two-thirds vote for approval. It would, in the
spirit of relaxed review previously noted under NEPA, be relatively
easy for a court under CEQA to find an abuse of discretion because
of the inconsistency. If there is inconsistency between the information submitted to the commission and the decision made
by them, are there situations where denial of a permit is mandated? 1 51 Assuming that a person aggrieved by project approval appealed to the state commission which upheld the decision made at the regional level, the next step is judicial challenge
of the permit approval. The questions presented by such judicial
challenge, consistent with the thesis of this article, are whether
the regional and state commissions abused their discretion in
granting the permit. The precise issues are whether it is an abuse
of discretion to find that the proposed project (1) does not have
any substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect'170 or
(2) is consistent with the findings and declarations of § 27001 and
with the objectives of § 27302.177
As with judicial review under A.B. 1301, at present the scope of
review of commission decisions under the Coastal Initiative is not
clear. It has been suggested herein that the combination of
CEQA and A.B. 1301 as applied to subdivisions would permit court
review on the question of adverse environmental impact which if
answered affirmatively would lead to a mandated denial. Thus, if
reports, an EIR or any other available information, disclose adverse environmental or ecological effect, or if inconsistencies between the policy sections of CZCA and the proposed development
are demonstrated, a court reviewing the project's approval could
reverse because the blatant inconsistency is an abuse of discretion.
Judicial involvement under both NEPA and CEQA derives from
the strong policy of the Acts, rather than an interpretation of pre17 8
cise definitions as to the courts' role. It was pointed out earlier
175. See text accompanying notes 122-26 for a similar analysis of A.B.
1301.
176. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 27402 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
177. CAL. PuB. REs.

CODE

§ 27402 (b) (West Supp. 1973).

178. See, text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
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that the initial determination whether there is adverse environmental impact or not can be reviewed on the precise factual merits. More importantly, we saw that the EIR itself can be reviewed
up to a point for factual accuracy. For the same reasons, if an
EIR is not used, the staff report should be reviewed by the courts.
Arguably an injunction could issue here as well-until an adequate
staff report is prepared. The court would not be substituting its
decision for that of a technically more able fact finder. Instead, because of the strong policy of the Coastal Initiative, it will be forcing
the commission to make findings consistent with the facts and information disclosed by the very processes that were statutorily executed to aid them.
The analysis in this article, up to this point, leads up to the final
issue. Assuming that courts do respond strongly in this area, and
force denial of environmentally sensitive projects, does this denial interfere with constitutionally protected property rights? In
environmentally sensitive areas such as lagoons, rocky or sandy
beaches, bluffs and other areas the situation may be such that denial of a particular permit is effectively a denial of any substantial
development at all. That leads directly to the question of whether
or not the use of the Coastal Zone Initiative or A.B. 1301 to deny a
permit, in these circumstances, constitutes inverse condemnation so
that compensation must be paid.
V.

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENvmoNmImxET

Our nation started as a nation of individual freeholders, adhering to a free market and private enterprise acknowledging little
governmental control of land use. 179 The history of land use
regulation is replete with examples of the courts saying that one is
absolutely entitled to make some reasonable economic use of property, and that a regulation that prohibits all use demands either
compensation or removal of the regulation. For example, where
land is zoned exclusively for industrial purposes for which there
is no demand over a long period, and there is a reasonable zoning
alternative, the owner's ability to obtain a return on his investment is unconstitutionally curtailed.8 0 Where the zoning in an
179. DELArONS, LAxw USE CONsToLs nT TE UNITED STATEs, 18, 19 (2nd ed.,
1969).
180. Corthouts v. Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953).

area is valid, but the general zoning imposes a unique hardship
upon a particular parcel, many courts say that the grant of a variance, which conforms to the spirit of the zoning, is constitutionally
mandated to assure some reasonable use of the land.1' 1 Where
zoning is changed to leave nonconforming uses on the land, they
can only be eliminated by direct payment or by an amortization
schedule which gives the landowner a reasonable return on his investment. 18 2 If an attempt is made to impose exactions or dedications upon subdivisions, which makes it economically unfeasible
to develop the land, the exactions are unconstitutional. 183 When
a local government attempts to prohibit development in an area
mapped for future streets which makes the balance of the parcel
economically unusable, the restriction must be removed or it is
an unconstitutional taking of private property by forcing a dedication under the guise of regulation. 18 4 Thus, there is strong historical support for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to
use his property in some way which produces a reasonable economic return.
Among the examples cited above, in some instances the regulation is an adjunct of a future taking by governmental entities. Or,
the regulation is unnecessarily harsh since an alternative use
would allow a greater economic return to the landowner and be
compatible with the general purpose of the questioned regulation.
These cases fit within the traditional land use values of grid zoning
and segregation of uses that have been prevalent since the early
part of this century. 8 5 However, environmentally sensitive land
use decisions assume that the existing natural condition of the
property should be maintained for environmental reasons per se.
The environmental reasons may vary from an objection to the direct destruction of a natural resource by a proposed use to the adverse effects which occur from small incremental changes in a
number of parcels in an area which is environmentally sensitive.
One house will not destroy a virgin and unique forest. But, a
subdivision may, and therefore the first house may have to be
prohibited. Or the environmental reason may be that the land in
its natural state is part of an ecological cycle which will be disrupted if the one segment is interfered with.
181. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING ANm LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW,

§ 106 (1971).
182. E.g., see City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d
34 (1954).
183. HAGMAN, supranote 181, § 138.
184. Id., § 150.
185. See, note 11 supra.
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The advocates of environmentally sensitive land use may not
want to make this land available to the public for its immediate or
even future use. If there is a desire, for instance, for a public
park, then compensation is probably warranted under all legal
standards. 8 6 But, in many situations where environmentally
sensitive land is involved, there is simply no alternative to leaving
it in its natural state if the external adverse effects of intensive
land use are to be avoided.
As discussed previously, A.B. 1301 and the Coastal Zone Initiative seemingly grant power to local agencies and commissions to
prohibit any change adversely affecting environmentally sensitive
lands. The dilemma, then, is to reconcile the very long tradition
of police power theory allowing a reasonable use of private property, with grants of power that mandate restrictions upon any
substantial change in the natural condition of that private property. A detailed analysis of all the interrelationships between
the police power and the power of eminent domain is beyond the
scope of this article. As has been pointed out elsewhere, distinctions in theory are made between the power of eminent domain
where private property is taken for a public use and the police

power where limitations are placed on the use of private property to prevent injury to others.
As mentioned previously the police power when applied to land
use regulation is commonly limited in two ways: (1) the restrictions must be reasonably related to the health, safety or general
welfare and (2) there must not be a taking accomplished under
the guise of regulation. Environmentally sensitive land use regulation probably is reasonable in the police power sense. The legislation discussed previously, the inclusion in the EIR of the reasons for the decision to regulate and the mandate given to deny
8 7
permits are strong presumptive evidence of that reasonableness1
186. For a summary of various views that have been advanced see,
HAGMAN, supra note 181, §§ 180, 181 (1971). See also, Sax, Takings, Private
Propertyand Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 148 (1971).

187. A second argument for sustaining permit denial arises under the
Coastal Zone Initiative. This permit power lasts only until a general coastline plan is submitted to the Legislature on the 91st day after the final
adjournment of the 1976 Regular Session. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 27650
(West Supp. 1973). There is precedence in California for moratoria on
permit issuance pending adoption of plans which are actively being de-

The resolution of the "taking" question is more complicated since
that term appears in the lore of both eminent domain and police power.
The "taking" limitation on the police power, has two possible
meanings. One is that the police power cannot be used to accomplish indirectly what is actually the equivalent of a dedication of
land for public use. The other is that a landowner has a right to
a minimum use of his property including some economic return
upon his investment in the land. Where landowners have successfully argued the latter they usually were in situations where the
prohibition is an unreasonable regulation because there is an alternative use, being sought by the landowner, which is equally
compatible with the purposes of the land use regulation. It is this
meaning which applies to environmentally sensitive land use since
by definition there is no dedication to public use, but rather a restriction to avoid adverse effects on the natural environment.
However, various attempts to restrict environmentally sensitive
land use could fail because a court determines that the particular
parcel of land is inappropriate for the restrictions imposed, that
is, it is not environmentally sensitive. Although the thesis here is
that the restrictions on environmentally sensitive land are reasonable under the police power, no court has so held and the regulations might fail in principle as well. If the regulations are
deemed invalid as applied or in principle, the question then becomes one of what remedy is available. Whether the regulation
is simply to be voided or payment for deprival of use value is to

be made depends on how inverse condemnation is analyzed in
comparison with eminent domain and the exercise of the police
power.

The generally accepted meaning of eminent domain is that the
state instigates the action in eminent domain, while the land-

owner brings the action for inverse condemnation when he believes that the state has, in fact, taken his land via eminent dovised. CAL. Gov. CODE § 65858 (West Supp. 1973); Miller v. Bd. of Pub.
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Metro Realty v. County of El
Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963). While the time interval from the initiating and terminating dates of the Commission's permit power is longer than the statutory time limits, the previous discussion
of the role of an initiative suggests it may be superior to the statute.
Moreover, the coastline plan is unique in its scope so maximum planning
time is required. Finally, the degrading of the coastline by permits causes
an irretrievable loss. Even though not expressly a moratorium initiative,
the rationale for sustaining permit restrictions during planning applies.
The courts should accept denials or restrictions during the planning stage
which it would not accept permanently.

[voL. 10: 693, 1973]

Land Use in California
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

main without payment. Both actions involve a permanent physical invasion of the property in question, and are distinguishable
only on the basis of who commences the legal action. Some commentators, especially where constitutional language includes both
taking and damaging as a basis for eminent domain, 188 have questioned whether an unconstitutional regulation might also be the
basis for a successful inverse condemnation suit.189 However,
there is little law to that effect, and "damages" can best be explained when applied to the taking of traditional property rights
such as access, 9 0 lateral support,' 9 or interference by pub192
lic facilities with the use of private property.
The cases discussed here 98 demonstrate that in environmental
decisions a rationale suggesting that a decrease in the economic
value of the land is not a critical consideration is appropriate.
Moreover, even where the regulation is deemed constitutionally
invalid because it results in a "taking" in the over-regulation sense,
the regulation should be declared invalid and issuance of the
permit should be mandated or the case should be remanded until
the regulation is constitutionally drafted or applied. Certainly
this has been the remedy in other situations when zoning has
94
been declared invalid.
In practice, the threat of successful inverse condemnation suits

could inhibit the decision maker in achieving the greatest benefit
to the public health, safety and welfare. Moreover, the decision
maker would be unable to weigh all the costs, including those to

taxpayers, before making the decision on whether or not to con188. Both terms are used in CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 14.
189. MANDELKLM, MANAGING OUR URAN ENVIRONIENT 624 (2d ed., 1971);
see also, Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on The Integrationof Police Power
and Eminent Domain By the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968 URBAN L. Asw. 1.

190. NIcHoLs oN Ei imi Domxix, § 6.32 (3d ed. 1970).
191. Id., at § 6.4441(6).
192. See, text accompanying notes 185 and 186 supra.
193. Particularly relevant are those in notes 208 and 209 as well as
cases effecting great economic loss such as Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239

U.S. 394 (1915), ($800,000 vs. $60,000 as zoned); Lockard v. City of Los

Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949) (worth four times more if
rezoned).
194. E.g., see, Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454,
327 P.2d 10 (1958), and the cases discussed in HAGmAN, supra note 181,

§ 119 (1971).

denm. Finally, this type of municipal regulation usually is discretionary and thus the governmental body' 95 and the individual decision maker' 9 6 are both immune from tort liability.
These immunities are designed to assure freedom of action in exercising legislative discretion and to place the primary responsibility for political decision upon the political processes. 197 Inverse condemnation liability would undermine this freedom whereas, court ordered granting of permits would not.
Moreover, no California case has been found where inverse condemnation arises solely out of a regulation of private use. Rather
the taking occurs directly or indirectly from traditional public
uses under the aegis of government. The classic cases in this regard include the successful inverse condemnation cases involving
airports where there are restrictive height limitations to facilitate
flying. Thus, the airplanes can be characterized as physically
invading the landowner's airspace and there is more involved than
mere regulation of land use.198 Even where the cause of action
is successfully couched in terms of nuisance or negligence, it is
the manner of airport operation rather than land regulation which
results in liability. 199

Two additional cases help further to establish the California position vis-h-vis the relationship between eminent domain and the
police power. In the first case, Kiopping v. City of Whittier,20
the action was one for inverse condemnation. The plaintiff had
been notified of a proposed condemnation of his land and condemnation was in fact commenced. When the proposed assessment scheme to finance the acquisition was challenged by another
plaintiff, the City of Whittier decided to abandon the condemnation proceedings, while giving notice that it would eventually sue

again. The commencement of the original action caused plaintiffs an alleged loss of rents. Their theory was that the procedure
used by the City was an unreasonable taking of the rental value
and, thus, was properly the subject of inverse condemnation.
The California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of one
195. CAL. Gov. CODE § 818.2 (West 1966).
196. CAL. Gov. CODE § 821 (West Supp. 1973).
197. See, Law Revision Commission Comment to West's Ann. Cal. Gov.
Code § 818.2 (West 1966); VAN ALsT E, CALiFoRN A GOvERNMENT TORT
LIABILITY, § 1.14 (C.E.B. 1964).
198. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 391 (1969).
199. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 568 (1972).
200. 8 Cal. 2d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
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plaintiff's action and remanded for a trial on the merits. The court
held that the plaintiff or
condemnee must be provided with an opportunity to demon-

strate that (1) the public authority acted improperly either by
unreasonably delaying eminent domain action following an announcement of intent to condemn or by other unreasonable conduct prior to condemnation; and (2) as a result of such action the
2 01

property in question suffered a diminution in market value.
This was clearly a case where the inverse condemnation occurred
in connection with the city's plan to physically take the plaintiff's
land and, thus, is not a regulation case, but a pre-condemnation
case. The plaintiff that still owned the land at the time of the
later completed condemnation action was denied recovery because his losses were to be recovered in that action.
The Court of Appeals opinion in the second case, Selby Realty
Co. v. City of San Buenaventura,20 2 has been vacated and a hearing granted, 20 3 but the implications for this article are sufficiently great to explore the issues it poses further. Selby was an
action by a landowner for inverse condemnation, declaratory relief, -damages and mandate which the trial court dismissed and
Selby Realty appealed. The plaintiff had applied for a building
permit to put a fifty-four unit apartment building on a 4.63 acre
parcel which was part of a larger tract of 120 acres owned by the
plaintiff both within and without the City. Because the planned
unit development failed to provide for the extension of a street
through the property, as mapped on the City's General Plan, the
Planning Commission disapproved the project. The Court of Appeals noted that dedication of the street under the Subdivision
Map Act was not in issue because the street in question was designed primarily to serve the general citizenry and not this particular development. 204 The Court pointed out that there was
more than simply an announced intention to condemn as in Klopping, but an actual denial of a permit within the future street area
201. Id. at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
202. 28 Cal. App. 3d 624, 104 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1972).
203. Although the opinion is a nullity in a technical sense, widespread
interest justifies giving the issues it poses some consideration pending final
disposition.
204. Selby Realty, Inc. v. City of San Buenaventura, 28 Cal. App. 3d 624,
104 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1972).

so that the denial was an effective taking of the right to use the
property.
The classic legal theory for subdivision regulations as such is
that forced dedications are constitutional where the subdivision
creates the need for the dedication. 20 5 Moreover, the California
case which permitted forced dedication absent a subdivision also
involved a situation where the land use itself, at least in part,
created the need for the dedication of land to widen the street
since it would generate substantial truck traffic. 20 6 These cases
each involve occupation by the public of the dedicated land in
question and thus raise issues of taking by eminent domain rather

than by regulation.
KIopping raises only an indirect, uncertain threat to the possi-

bilities proposed in this article. 20 7 At most, it suggests that if a
local agency or commission in applying A.B. 1301 or the Coastal
Zone Initiative were to delay unreasonably in condemning or deciding on a permit, there might be liability for interim losses. If
denial of a permit were eventually reversed and there were negligence in the original denial, interim losses might be recoverable.
It in no way suggests, however, that the full value of the land as
reduced by regulation is to be awarded in an action for inverse
condemnation. If the result in Selby is sustained, it may be an
extension of Klopping to a wide variety of situations where planning for a future physical invasion produces present economic detriment and results in present damages. But, even that result
would occur only if a permit were specifically denied because of
the plan for future condemnation for public use.
However, it should be reemphasized that in both Klopping and
Selby, the damages are attributable to the fact that the public is
eventually going to use the land. Thus, these two cases reflect the
more traditional analysis, previously cited in examples, where
there was an actual or prospective physical invasion of private
property, rather than an over-zealous use of the police power.
These cases arguably are not at all related to environmentally
sensitive use of the police power, since even though the economic
205. Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d
1 (1949).
206. Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51
Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966).
207. The court in Klopping says that its conclusion is supported by CAL,.
CODE CIV. PRO. § 1243.1 (West 1972) which states that if a governmental
entity decides by resolution or ordinance to acquire property by eminent
domain and fails to initiate proceedings within six months, the landowner
may bring suit.
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consequences may be the same, the goal of protecting other property or general public rights from the adverse external impacts of
the prohibited users is quite different. It is important, then, to
turn to several other cases where the courts have reacted favorably to environmentally sensitive regulations which make it, in
practice, impossible for a landowner to use his property in any
economic way.
The first of these cases is Consolidated Rock Products Co. v.
City of Los Angeles.208 In that case, the land under consideration was 340 acres situated in a flood plain with a surface of rock,
sand and gravel to a depth of approximately forty feet. The land
was in the shape of a natural amphitheatre and was surrounded
by a canyon, a national forest, a dam, hills, and high cliffs. As a
practical matter, the only use that could be made of the land was
for extraction of rock and gravel. The soil was unsuitable for
other uses, there was a continuing flood problem, and the trial
court found that any other use would be impossible. Moreover,
the land was situated next to and below a residential development
which the trial court found had a national reputation as a haven
for sufferers from respiratory ailments and was inhabited by
persons who found that area particularly desirable for that reason. The trial court further determined that use of the land for
substantial rock, sand or gravel extraction would greatly interfere
with the reputation of the area and the use presently being made
by sufferers of respiratory ailments.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly concluded that the landowner had no right to use his property as he
had requested, even though denial of that use effectively deprived
the landowner of any use of his property. Of course, it is possible to analyze Consolidated Rock as a very traditional case involving the abatement of a nuisance through use of the police
power. However, the case can also be explained within the framework of environmentally sensitive land use regulation which results in the preservation of a natural environmental setting. The
case is of great interest to this article because the court was sensitive to the air pollution problem that applied to the area, and because the court sustained a regulation even though it left the landowner with no economic use for his property.
208. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).

Another California case, Candlestick Properties,Inc. v. San Fran20
is of
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission,

significance both because it is a case involving an environmentally sensitive area and because it arises under an act which established the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission (BCDC) ,210 after which the Coastal Initiative was
modeled.211 The action sought review of BCDC's denial of a
fill permit on plaintiff's land which was submerged at high tide
by waters of the San Francisco Bay. Plaintiff's sole purpose in
acquiring the land was to deposit fill from a construction project.
The adjoining parcels were either filled or in the process of being
filled, and plaintiff's land was non-navigable at high tide. There
was a dispute between the plaintiff and BCDC as to whether any
use could be made of the land other than that contemplated by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that filling was the sole possible use, while the BCDC 'argued alternatives existed such as
dredging or partial filling for some water related use.
While the opinion is directed primarily at questions of procedure
and legislative interpretation, it finally discussed the question of
whether or not the regulation constituted a taking demanding compensation, as plaintiff argued. Relying partly on Consolidated Rock and partly on another leading and strongly worded
case supportive of the police power, 212 the court rather summarily supported the legislative determination of the regulation's wisdom and necessity. The court noted, as is so common in
this type of case, that if the reasonableness of the regulation is
debatable, the legislative determination will not be voided. The
court displayed an understanding and recognition of the environmental sensitivity of land use decisions in the Bay area when it

said:
...
that the bay is the most valuable single natural resource of
the entire region and changes in one part of the bay may also affect all other parts; that the present uncoordinated, haphazard
manner in which the bay is being filled threatens the bay itself
and is therefore inimical to the welfare of both present and future
residents of the bay area; and that a regional
approach is necessary
to protect the public interest in the bay.21 3

209. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970), noted at 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 695 (1971).
210. CAL. Gov. CoDE § 66600 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).
211. See, Baum & Jackson, Regional Planning;the Coastal Zone Initiative
Analyzed in Light of the B.C.D.C. Experience, 47 CAL. STATE BAR J. 427
(1972).
212. See, Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1928).
213. Candlestick Prop. Inc. v. San Francisco Bay C. & D. Comm'n, 11
Cal. App. 3d 557, 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1970), 2 ERC 1075, 1081.
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The court went on to suggest that the limitation, at least in part,
was temporary since the BCDC had not yet fulfilled its mandate
21 4
to plan development in the Bay Area.
Candlestick Properties is very significant as it relates to the
thesis of this article. The court's willingness to allow severe restrictions on land use through the police power to effectuate the
environmental goals with which the BCDC was charged, again
illustrates that the question of taking of private property involves
more than simply whether or not the regulation causes a severe
decrease in economic value.
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the case is that it arose
from legislation that is very analogous to the Coastal Zone Initiative, and thus, may represent a preview of decisions that could
arise under the situations herein described. A synthesis of the
holdings of Candlestick Propertiesand Consolidated Rock presents
-authority combining the strongly worded environmental goals of
legislatively created agencies (BCDC) with severe restraints on the
use of property in an environmentally insensitive manner even if
that means that the landowner is severely limited in developing
the economic potential of his land.
One must go outside California to find a single case that prohibits development of environmentally sensitive lands even though
economic use of the private property is almost completely eliminated. A recent Wisconsin case, Just v. Marinette County,21 5 will
undoubtedly become one of the leading cases in the country concerning the interrelationship between environmental law and tra214. It is interesting to note that some of the cases advanced by plaintiff
in support of his argument that the permit denial constituted a taking were
cases distinguished by the court as being flood plain zoning cases which
arguably appropriated private property for open space. California now
supports the concept of flood plain zoning and this may very well have
minimized the impact of this language in Candlestick Properties. Flood
plain zoning is, in a sense, environmentally sensitive, as it tends to require
an owner to leave his property in its natural condition. Of course, it should
be pointed out that the goal of flood plain zoning is not to preserve open
space, but is primarily aimed at protecting persons and property from flood
danger and, thus, fits more easily within traditional concepts of the police
power. See, Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 93 (1972); see also Comment, Flood Plain Zoning in California-Open
Space by Another Name: Policy and Practicality, 10 SAx DIEGO L. REV.

381 (1973).
215. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), 4 ERC 1841.

ditional land use. Wisconsin has long been a leader in the protection of various kinds of water related natural resources and
the regulation in question was adopted pursuant to the State's
Water Resources Law, 210 designed to protect wetland resources.
The statute so defined wetlands to include the property of the
complaining landowner. The land had no navigable waters, but
included areas of standing water and aquatic and non-aquatic
plants. In order to make the land usable, the landowner had commenced to fill the property without obtaining the required permit.
The regulation in question allowed uses that involved non-residential and non-permanent buildings, such as the harvesting of
wild crops, placement of utility poles, hunting and fishing, hiking,
bridle paths and similar non-intensive recreational uses. The court
recognized that "[t]he real issue is whether the conservancy district provisions and the wetlands-filling restrictions are unconstitutional because they amount to a constructive taking of the Justs'
land without compensation. 2 17 However, it became clear that
the court's restating of the issues would place the case in a context
which is unique to legal analysis. The court said:
To state the issue in more meaningful terms, it is a conflict between the public interest in stopping the despoilation of the
natural resources, which our citizens until recently had taken as
inevitable and for granted, and an owner's asserted right to use
his property as he wishes. The protection of public rights may be
accomplished by the exercise of the police power unless the
damage to the property owner is too great and amounts to a confiscation. The securing or taking of a benefit not presently enjoyed by the public for its use is obtained by the government
through its power of eminent domain. The distinction between
the exercise of the police power and condemnation has been said
to be a matter of degree of damage to the property owner. In the
valid exercise of the police power reasonably restricting use of
property, the damage suffered by the owner is said to be incidental. However, where the restriction is so great the landowner
ought not to bear such a burden for the public good, the restriction
has been held to be a constructive taking even though the actual
use or forbidden use has not been transferred to the government
so as to be a taking in a traditional sense.2 18

While this portion of the opinion clearly reflects a high degree
of sensitivity toward the problem of protecting natural resources,
it would seem to lead one to the conclusion that if the property
has very little profitable use because of the regulation, there
would be, in fact, a taking. However, the court went on from that
point to equivocate, by acknowledging a difference between the
216. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 59.971, 144.26 (Supp. 1973).

217. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d at -,
ERC at 1843.
218. Id. at -, 201 N.W.2d at 767, 4 ERC at 1843-44.

201 N.W.2d at 767, 4
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creation of a public benefit and the prevention of a public harm
by saying the latter is the proper function of the police power and
the former is the function of eminent domain thus requiring compensation. The court recognized that, "[in the instant case we
have a restriction on the use of a citizens' property, not to secure
a benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change
in the natural character of the citizens' property."219
The court was careful to point out the interrelationship between
the wetlands, the swamps, the natural environment of the shore
lands, the purity of water and natural resources such as navigation,
fishing and scenic beauty. It recognized that the formerly unfavorable view of swamps and wetlands changed with the greater
awareness of the vital role in nature between the various elements
within an ecological system. The court made a subtle, but very
important distinction when it said that the filling of wetlands,

not otherwise commercially usable, is not in and of itself an existing use which is prevented, but rather such filling is the preparation of the land for some non-indigenous use. The court said that
the plaintiffs have over-emphasized their right to change the land
from commercially valueless land to something which is usable for
commercial purposes. The court noted that the argument about
the taking of value lies in the value that would exist if the plaintiffs were allowed to fill and not in the value as it presently then
existed. 220 The statement from the case that will undoubtedly
become a classic is:
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change
the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which
injures the rights of others. The exercise of the police power in
zoning must be reasonable and we think that it is not an unreasonable exercise of the police power to prevent harm to public rights
221
by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.

219. Id.
220. In upholding the regulation, the court cited numerous cases to the
contrary, particularly in the Northeast. See, State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711
(Me. 1970) and MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255

N.E.2d 347 (1970), concerning wetland zoning. See also, Dooley v. Town

Planning and Zoning Comm'n., 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), and
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963)

detention basins.

concerning flood plain zoning and flood

221. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d at -, 201 N.W.2d at 768, 4 ERC
at 1844. It is interesting to note that the natural use of land concept

Just also makes brief and not strongly analytical references to
the public trust doctrine as it relates to navigable waters.

222

This

article will not explore the potential for using that doctrine in
conjunction with coastal zone lands or the subdivision regulations,
insofar as they pertain to the coastline. Undoubtedly, efforts will
be made to try to establish that land which was historically within
the mean high tide line, or which would affect natural resources
within the mean high tide line, should be protectable under a
public trust doctrine which may serve to substantially restrict the
223
uses which can be made by private owners of that land.
While Just is the strongest environmentally oriented case to
date, other than those arising under NEPA and CEQA, there are
two additional cases that are noteworthy for their strong environmental sensitivity to land use regulations. The first is Golden v.
Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo.224

Ramapo dealt with

the problem of the non-availability of community services. The
court upheld the municipality's zoning that incorporated the phasing of growth over an eighteen year period. The justification for
this phased growth was that various municipal services could not
be conveniently and practically provided by the city unless such a
phasing plan were implemented. The city had performed an extensive study and made long range plans for capital expansion in
phases. The ordinance in question did provide that if the land
developer supplied the necessary sewers, drainage facilities, public
parks, public schools, roads and fire houses, development could in
fact proceed ahead of the phasing plan. The implication of Ramapo's phased growth, in the context of this article, is that courts
are becoming aware of the problems accompanying growth and
development. Reasonable plans for orderly growth and minimal
environmental damage are at the heart of both the Coastal Initiative and A.B. 1301.
raised in Just could very well be traced to the historical case of Rylands
v. Fletcher, 1868, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, and the distinctions therein whereby one
who made an unnatural use of his land was deemed to be liable to third
persons for any harm which that caused. Of course, in that case the
unnatural use may very well have been an incompatibility or abnormality
of use within the area rather than the use of land in a way other than that
for which it was fit in its natural state. The debate has raged without
resolution and could conceivably be raised again at this time.
222. 56 Wis. 2d at -, 201 N.W.2d at 768, 4 ERC at 1844.
223. See, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine on Natural Resource Law; Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mic. L. Rav. 471 at 524-544 (1970). See
also, Note, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HAsTnras L.J.
759 (1971).
224. 30 N.Y.S.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
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22 5
Another recent case, Steel Hill Development v. San Bornton,
illustrates a receptive judicial attitude to environmentally sensitive land use regulations. Here, the landowner had originally
proposed a cluster development on land which at that time was
zoned for three-quarter acre lots. The town, however, rezoned
the land into three and six acre minimum lots, and placed the
land into four conservation and agricultural zones. The Court of
Appeals, cautioning against attempts directed solely at curtailing
growth, was willing to sustain the three and six acre minimum lot
zoning. The court did recognize that the effect of the decision
would be to decrease considerably the value of the property, but
pointed out that the land was not rendered valueless, and thus,
did not accept the property owners' taking argument. The court,
however, did recognize the environmental sensitivity of the area
when it said:

The District Court found that, as the San Bornton Planning Board
had itself determined, topography and soil conditions posed severe
problems of pollution, improper sewage disposal, poor drainage
and erosion to largescale developments of the Steel Hill tract,
justifying imposition of the three-acre minimum lot size requirement in accordance with the public health. We have carefully
read the conflicting trial testimony of the various experts who exand cannot say that the court's
pressed an opinion on these 2matters
finding is clearly erroneous. 26

The series of cases discussed in this section shows that any prohibition against development, or any other kind of denial of a permit will be carefully scrutinized to see if it is aimed at a legitimate
legislative purpose. If the restriction is one limited in time, it
will be sustainable for purposes of permitting more orderly growth
and the phasing of development until municipal type services
are acquired, as was illustrated in Ramapo. Environmentally sensitive goals arising from problems of sewage disposal and air pollution can be attained by large lot zoning, as illustrated in Steel
Hill. However, if there are unavoidable adverse environmental
consequences when the land is used in the only economically feasible way, as in Consolidated Rock or as suggested by the record in
Candlestick Park, California courts appear willing to uphold regulations which prevent landowners from changing the natural con225. 469 F.2d 959 (1st Cir. 1972), 4 ERC 1746.
226. Id. at 960, 4 ERC at 1747.

dition of their property. It is not much of an extension of these
cases to suggest that California would accept the Just rationale
and conclude that if an area in its natural state is environmentally

sensitive-if it interrelates with other natural resources that are
clearly within the public domain such as the beaches, the ocean
resources, the navigable waters and so on-then, too, the restriction can be such that the land may produce little if any economic
return. It should not be forgotten that the language of the California cases involving CEQA, Friends of Mammoth, the Coastside
Water District and other cases suggest that California courts are
indeed sympathetic to environmental needs.
VI.

WILL THIS PACKAGE WORK?

The theme of this article, centers around an admittedly fragile
package involving a number of untested legal arguments that are
in some instances speculative. First, California courts must be
willing to accept a somewhat rigorous interpretation of CEQA
similar to that given NEPA by the federal courts. Early indications, as evidenced by Friends of Mammoth, Coastside County
Water District, and County of Inyo, suggest such a rigorous interpretation is, in fact, materializing.
The first step is to assure that the approving agency does not
avoid its responsibilities by making a negative declaration and not
preparing an EIR. Then, once an environmental impact report
has been prepared by an agency, the means would be available to
insure that the content of the EIR accurately reflects any adverse
impact which may in fact occur. Assuming the EIR establishes
adverse impact in the case of subdivisions under A.B. 1301, or
once a combination of staff reports, evidence from public hearings
and, if applicable, an EIR, demonstrate substantial adverse environmental effect under the Coastal Initiative, the next step is to

insure conformity between these findings and those required by
A.B. 1301 and the Initiative.
At this point, the respective bodies responsible under each of
these legislative mandates must prohibit the proposed use and
perhaps any use in the environmentally sensitive area. The extension of Consolidated Rock and Candlestick Properties, or acceptance of the rationale of Just, completes this fragile package.
This last step serves to justify the restraint upon the use of environmentally sensitive property, and relieves local agencies from
the problems of law suits seeking either to reverse decisions or to
gain compensation due to alleged inverse condemnation. Much
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emphasis is placed upon the question of compensation. This is because it is assumed that the amount of environmentally sensitive
land in the coastal zone and other areas of the state, while a small
percentage of total state land, is such that if compensation were
required, it would be financially impossible to carry out the purpose of the legislation discussed here.
The next question is whether or not it is politically likely that
this package can, in fact, be followed by decision makers without
the need for lawsuits. It is this author's estimate that the likelihood of all existing political entities throughout the state following
the route suggested by this article without either lawsuits, or at
least threatened lawsuits, is unlikely. Of course, there is no available empirical data indicating whether decision makers are in
fact willing to take the risk of making decisions against a landowner without the prodding of a threatened lawsuit commenced
by parties philosophically aligned with strong environmental policy. This is especially true when there is a very substantial likelihood that the landowner himself will sue. This poses the attendant risk that the local governmental body may lose the suit and
be forced to pay an inverse condemnation award, or to reverse its
original decision. The suspicion here is that some decision makers
are unwilling to take that political risk; others may articulate a

belief that the restriction will be illegal as an unconstitutional
regulation of private property to avoid taking the risk; still others
may actually believe such action constitutes a taking. The question then is whether there are other actors within the system who
can force these results if local decision makers are in fact, reluctant to impose the restrictions that are statutorily mandated.
The first person, or group of persons, who might be able to accomplish this result are government attorneys who directly 'advise the various decision making bodies. This group includes
County Counsel, the City Attorney or the Attorney General in his
advisory capacity with the coastal commission. This writer suspects that it may be difficult for the government attorney, even
if convinced of the validity of these arguments, to follow through.
It must be pointed out that these attorneys are essentially working
with and for the local agencies and commissions they advise. The
government attorney may be subject to the same kinds of political
restraints as the decision makers themselves, for a lost lawsuit

runs the risk of lost votes if the attorney is elected, or jeopardized
credibility if he is appointed. It is natural to expect that in most
instances the government attorney will reflect the same views or
will attempt to support the views of the individuals who comprise
the agencies. Advocacy of a strong environmental position against
a particular development or project in the face of an agency more
inclined than not to grant permits might jeopardize the attorney's
position with the legislative body or with the voters, depending on
whether he is appointed or elected.
There are other substantial problems that a government attorney faces if he wants to follow through with this package. The
entire process here is a complicated one, and it suggests that the
government attorney will need to start working with an individual
project and follow it through step by step to assure that the impact
statement is made, that it accurately reflects the facts, etc. It is
unlikely that a government attorney will have the time or resources to stick with a single project from its inception throughout the various decisional processes. Moreover, his relationship
to planning processes may be such that he provides advice only at
the final stages of a particular planning process. Perhaps of most
importance, however, is the fact that the developer who is thus restrained inevitably has an economic interest in the matter that
will justify large expenditures for attorney's fees. In fact, an in-

dividual developer may retain, for one project, a staff of attorneys
larger in size than the city's entire legal staff. In a small city
there may only be one part-time government attorney, and he may
be pitted against a staff of attorneys which can spend its full-time
on a particular problem. These are rather overwhelming odds,
and it would not be surprising if this package simply is not put
together or is fragmented. While the government attorney may
give advice consistent with the theme of this article as to the individual parts, sooner or later some portion of it may break down.
Recent legislation suggests that the Attorney General, not in
his advisory capacity to the coastal zone commission, but in his
more general state-wide function, has the capability of following
the route herein suggested. Article 8 of the Government Code entitled Environmental Actions, 227 grants power to the Attorney
General to intervene in any judicial or administrative proceeding
in which facts are alleged concerning adverse environmental effects which could affect the public generally. 228 The findings and
227. CAL. Gov. CoDE §§ 12600-12612 (West Supp. 1973), added by Stats.
1971, ch. 1518, p. 2994, § 3.
228. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12606 (West Supp. 1973).
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declarations of this Act, in part, establish a state policy to conserve and protect California's natural resources. 229 Similarly, a
recently enacted section of the Code of Civil Procedure requires
that a party seeking relief from pollution or adverse environmental effects which could affect the public generally furnish a copy
28 0
of the pleadings to the Attorney General.
Thus, the Attorney General's office now has the authority to
deal with environmental problems 231 in such a way that if the
office or members of the staff become convinced that the rationale
of this article is sound, and if they can obtain the authority to
proceed, they could follow a particularly sensitive project step by
step through the process. They could, thus, become aware of
events in a particular community or within the jurisdiction of
one of the regional coastal commissions with potential environmental effect, such as filling a lagoon. With their knowledge of
these potential harms to sensitive areas, they will not be subject to
the resource limitations of individual representatives of the Attor-

ney General acting in an advisory capacity, or the limitations of
other government attorneys. The Attorney General can then proceed step by step to follow particularly sensitive developments
through the decision process, and ultimately establish the test case
on the question of whether or not the package fits together well.
Other groups that can test this package are environmentally oriented citizen groups, either local or more broadly based city-wide,
state-wide or nation-wide groups. Some of these groups, particularly the ones with a state or nation-wide membership, in fact,
have the resources to carry through with a well researched test
case or cases. These broader based organizations such as the Sierra
Club or the Environmental Defense Fund have spent much
of their efforts dealing with NEPA. However, they certainly have
the potential to become involved in the private development decision making process, especially when it is recognized that an individual suit directly affecting only a small parcel of property
can greatly affect land use decisions throughout the state.
229.

CAL.

Gov.

CODE § 12600 (West Supp. 1973).
CODE OF CIVIL PRO. § 389.6 (West Supp.

1973), added by Stats.
1971, ch. 1518, p. 2993, § 1.
231. The Attorney General's Office has acted under this authority as a
participant in Friends of Mammoth, Coastside County Water District, and
Desert Environmental Conservation Association.
230. CAL.

Having suggested a strong, environmentally sensitive package
that arguably limits the broad discretion of local land use decision
makers is not to say that the result of this package would necessarily be correct from an environmental policy point of view. Perhaps no person or small group of persons is capable of saying
what ought to be the relationship between land use 'and the public interest in the environment and what ought to be the limits
upon regulation which are imposed by the constitutional importance of the concept of private property. There is certainly a
need for more careful considerations of the reverberations, economic and otherwise, resulting from following an avenue such as
the one suggested. Although local decision makers at times do
not reflect such policies, there is no room for doubting that both
A.B. 1301 and the Coastal Zone Initiative reflect a legislative and
popular desire that some natural resources be protected absolutely,
and that some adverse environmental impacts be avoided completely. Apparently effectuating this policy is seen as the only
way in which to provide for the long-range protection of the environment, and the fullest utilization of the State's natural resources. This environmentally sensitive package involving NEPA
to CEQA, through A.B. 1301 and the Coastal Zone Initiative, by
way of Just, if tested step by step in the courts, would permit a
clear cut and precise review of the land use decision process and
provide a clear understanding of the limits of environmental protection in California. The package is fragile, but the costs of re-

jecting it are arguably high.

